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A REVIEW OF THE LAW OF BANK MERGERS*
EARL W. KINTNER** AND HUGH C. HANSEN***
Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortes once said that "
trust is as deeply embedded in the American scene as baseball, bourbon
whiskey, and aspirin."' While many people would agree with this
statement, it is perhaps least true when applied to banking. This is
evidenced by the bitter reaction to the application of the antitrust laws
to bank mergers in the last two decades. This article will explore that
reaction as well as the rather strange development of bank merger
regulation and its effect on both bank mergers and bank holding com-
pany mergers. First we shall take a brief look at the relationship of
banks and competition to help explain the policy struggle that came to
a climax in the 1960's.
I. BANKING AND COMPETITION
There has always been a dichotomy of views on the value of com-
petition in banking. This dichotomy was evidenced in the struggles of
Jefferson and Hamilton, Jackson and Biddle, and much later, Carter
Glass and Huey Long.' After the defeat of the Second Bank of the
* This article is based upon research material which will appear in part as a chapter
in Earl W. Kintner's fourth primer, A Primer on the Law of Mergers, to be published in
April, 1973, by the Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y.
** A.B., DePauw University, 1936; J.D., Indiana University, 1938; Chairman, Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 1959-61; Member, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Wash-
ington, D.C.
*** A.B., Rutgers University, 1968; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1972;
Law Clerk to Judge Inzer B. Wyatt, United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The author was formerly a law clerk at Arent, Fox, Kintner,
Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.
1
 Fortas, Portents for New Antitrust Policy, 10 Antitrust Bull. 41, 42 (1965).
2 See Hale, Mergers of Financial Institutions, 21 Bus. Law. 211, 212 (1965). In
each of these struggles there were other issues besides competition. Jefferson and Hamil-
ton disputed the very power of the federal government to create such a national bank.
Also the opponents of Hamilton's programs were afraid that such a bank would induce
the mercantile class to identify their interest with, and support, a strong central govern-
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United States, the proponents of free competition dominated the scene.
Andrew Jackson expressed the view of many when, in vetoing the
renewal of the Second Bank of the United States, he stated: "It is easy
to conceive that great evils to our country and its institutions might
flow from such a concentration of power in the hands of a few men."'
President Tyler vetoed the charter for a Third Bank for much the same
reason.4 On the local level many states imposed strict branching reg-
ulations in order to restrict banking concentration, while both federal
and state laws allowed easy entry into banking.' This legislation per-
mitted the growth of many local banks and reflected the desire that
banking should not be limited to the privileged and rich.° However,
"free banking" led to situations in some states where anyone could
open his own bank and even issue his own bank notes without any form
of security or supervision.' A compromise bill to resolve the differences
between the monopolistic Bank of the United States and the financial
insecurity of free banking was introduced by Senator Sherman—whose
name was later put on another act—in 1863. 8 It sought to establish a
ment. 1 L. Pollack (ed.), The Constitution and the Supreme Court 201-02 (1966).
Jackson was concerned with the basic states rights questions as well as the fact that he
thought the Bank was an instrument of aristocratic privilege and manipulation. Id. at
209-11. But in addition to these issues was always the fear of a small minority with
monopolistic control over the money supply of the country and the power that follows
any monopoly, but especially one of this kind.
8 2 J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents
580-81 (1905). The author of the address was Jackson's Secretary of the Treasury, a
Maryland lawyer named Roger B. Taney. Four years Iater Jackson named him Chief
Justice of the United States.
Interestingly enough, it has been suggested that the real force behind the demise of
the Second Bank was the New York financial community, represented by Martin Van
Buren, a close adviser to Jackson. Rather than stopping "such a concentration of power
in the hands of a few men," they merely wanted to shift the power from Philadelphia
to New York. Ironically, they were only half successful since a Bank of the United
States was never reestablished in New York. See Hammond, Banking before the Civil
War, in Banking and Monetary Studies 13 (D. Carson ed. 1963).
4 The veto message is contained in 4 J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the President 63-72 (1905). While Tyler vetoed the bill for the Third
Bank, be had earlier supported a resolution censuring Jackson for his activities against
the Second Bank. See J. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 228-29 (19M).
6 See Shull & Horvitz, The Bank Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After, 16 Antitrust
Bull. 859, 862 (1971).
6 Hammond, Banking Before the Civil War, in Banking and Monetary Studies
7ff. (D. Carson ed. 1963).
7 Hale, supra note 2, at 212.
8 Years later Sherman recalled the reason for his bill:
The issue of circulating notes by state banks had been the fruitful cause of
loss, contention and bankruptcy, not only of the banks issuing them, but of all
business men depending upon them for financial aid. Inflation and apparent
prosperity were often followed by the closing of one bank and distrust of all
others. The notes of a broken bank were rarely paid, the assets of such bank
being generally applied to the payment of other liabilities, leaving the loss to
fall on the holders of the notes, mostly innocent persons of limited means.
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"National Bank System."9 The subsequent creation of this national
bank system and the strengthening of the state bank system resulted
in the dual banking system we have today.
The Depression had a strong effect on the banking industry. In
the early 1930's over 9,000 banks failed and 2,300 more were absorbed
by mergers." This bank instability led to the Bank Holiday of March
1933, the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 and the Banking Act of
1935.11 As a result of these and other laws entry into banking became
much more difficult. However, even before the impact of the Depression
the banking industry had been undergoing changes. Improvement of
transportation facilities decreased the need for local banks, since cus-
tomers were now more mobile; industrial growth precipitated the de-
mand for larger, more centralized banks with greater assets. More banks
merged, and others failed from natural causes as the banking market
became more concentrated. From 1921 to 1933 over 15,000 banks
failed, and the total number of banking offices decreased from 31,000
to 17,000. 12 Then, in the middle 1930's, as a result of the federal
legislation, the banking situation stabilized and the next fifteen years
even saw a slow retreat from banking concentration!' However, the
traumatic years of bank failures and bankruptcies were not forgotten;
many would have agreed with the 1959 Senate report that found the
banking failures to have been "the result of too much competition.'
In the 1950's a tremendous resurgence in mergers resulted in
further banking concentration. This consolidation once again brought
into conflict the two opposing philosophies. The question this time was
whether the antitrust laws should be applicable to bank mergers. One
side felt, in the words of the Attorney General, that "because of the
central role of banks in relation to other businesses, the traditional anti-
trust goal of prevention of undue concentration is as important in bank-
ing as in any other field!'" The other side countered with the argument
1 J. Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet 282-83
(1895).
9 Sherman recognized that the basic objections to the "monopolistic" U. S. Bank
"did not lie against the organization of a system of national banks extending over the
country, which required every dollar of notes issued to be secured by a larger amount
of bonds of the United States, to be deposited in the treasury of the United States, thus
saving the note holder from all possibility of loss." Id. at 283.
10 S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959).
11
 See Shull & Horvitz, supra note 5, at 864.
12 Id. at 863.
13
 Id. at 878.
14
 S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959). See also 105 Cong. Rec. 8076
(1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson). See generally Kent, Dual Banking between the
Two World Wars in Carson, supra note 3, at 43ff.
19
 Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcomm. on Domestic Finance of the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1965) (testimony of Att'y Gen.
Katzenbach).
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that "to permit unregulated and unrestricted competition to become the
business philosophy of banking could only have dire consequences for
the general public which prefers a stable financial structure" and that
increased concentration results in stronger institutions and "therefore
serves as a safeguard against failure.'"
For five years bills that sought to check banking concentration
were introduced. Finally, in 1960, the Bank Merger Act" was passed.
This act can be viewed as something of a compromise between the two
philosophies since it recognized the unique nature of banking and also
—to a lesser degree—the need for competition. Yet it did not resolve
the conflict. Rather, it marked only the first round of a policy strug-
gle that was to match Congress against the Supreme Court and one
government agency against another. Some have characterized this
struggle as a breakdown in the normal separation of powers doctrine
which guides the legislature and the judiciary. Whether this conten-
tion is true or not, these events did cast doubt on the ability of Con-
gress to regulate economic activity and at the same time provided one
of the most interesting chapters in American antitrust history.
A. Why Do Banks Merge?
Before we discuss the substantive development of bank merger
regulation it would be wise to examine some of the reasons which moti-
vate banks to merge." The principal motivation is the desire to expand
the capital assets of the bank. There are federal limitations on the
amount a bank can lend, based upon a percentage of its capital stock
and surplus." A bank might fear that its present assets are insufficient
to permit it to service its growing industrial clients or to compete for
larger industrial clients. This was one of the reasons for the Philadelphia
National Bank merger" and was one of the reasons frequently noted
by the Comptroller of the Currency in his approvals of mergers."
18 Casson & Burrus, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, 18 Am. U. L. Rev. 677,
678 (1969). See generally Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
17
 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.	 1828 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.	 1828(c)
(Supp. 1971).
18 See generally Casson & Burns, supra note 16, at 679.
18 12 U.S.C. 84 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (Supp, 1972).
28 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963). See text at
notes 88-106 infra.
21 see, e.g., 1965-66 Comp, Curr, Ann. Rep, 52:
As regards lending limits, in 1963, the applicants as a group placed or shared
only two loans which exceeded the lending limit of the originating bank. How-
ever, it is expected that the merger will have a beneficial impact on the county's
economy through stimulating the creation of larger business and agricultural
units and attracting new industry to the area which will need larger loans.
Id.
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Another motivation is the desire to realize economies of scale."
Many banks suffer from a lack of depth in management" and, when
two banks merge, the best personnel of the banks can be used to manage
and develop the larger assets of the combined bank. Furthermore, the
larger size of the bank and larger salaries that it can afford can be used
to attract new talent." Because banks compete with the glamor con-
glomerates for management personnel, they cannot afford to be consid-
ered small back-waters or retirement farms. This factor was important
in the Phillipsburg Bank merger" and is another reason the Comptroller
has often cited when approving mergers.2°
A third reason is "the desire for competitive diversification of
deposits and services."" By merging, a bank can increase the number
of its branches or its ability to branch in the future. It can also combine
its specialty with that of another bank. For example, one bank might
have abundant trust funds while the other has a good investment
counseling service, and a merger would allow for the maximum efficient
use of both. Sometimes, too, the sheer size of a large bank will force
potential competitors to merge in order to meet the challenge. Such was
the case in the Crocker-Anglo National Bank merger which was part
of an effort to compete with the mammoth Bank of America in Cali-
fornia."
While these considerations are not the only motivations for banks
to merge they are certainly the dominant ones; in almost any merger
one can see a variation of them. Yet while these considerations may
provide ample justification for the banks' stockholders and the Comp-
troller, they may not, as we shall see, withstand the test of judicial
review.
22
 Casson & Burrus, supra note 16, at 680.
22
 See Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1965).
24 Bigness has been considered a psychological advantage in attracting new per-
sonnel. See Reed, Primer for a President, 1 Mergers & Acquisitions 21 (1965).
25
 As will be seen later, such importance is not necessarily enough to justify a
merger. The Supreme Court in the Phillipsburg case instructed the district court on re-
mand to consider in concrete detail the adequacy of the merging banks' attempts "to
overcome their Loan, trust, and personnel difficulties by methods short of their own
merger." United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 372 (1970).
See text at notes 163-79 infra.
26 See, e.g., 1965-66 Comp. Curr. Ann. Rep. 49.
27 Casson & Burrus, supra note 16, at 681. For a general discussion of motivations
under this category see Gruis, Antitrust Laws and Their Application to Banking, 24 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 89 (1959) ; Administrator of Nat'l Banks, A Statement of Policy, in
Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking Structure 401, 406 (1966).
28 See United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 149 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
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B. Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws
For many years bank mergers were considered out of the reach of
the antitrust laws.' Section 7 of the Clayton Act contained a large
loophole which in effect exempted asset acquisitions from the scope of
the Act. Historically, banks have almost always combined through such
asset acquisitions or through some form of statutory merger or consoli-
dation with assumption of liabilities or exchanges of stock8° Conse-
quently, the Clayton Act had as little effect on bank mergers as it did
on other industrial mergers.
The Sherman Act applied to bank mergers but in over seventy
years only one action was filed and that was not until 1959. 31 The
problem with the Sherman Act was that the Government had to prove
that the merger had, in fact, already restrained trade unreasonably.
This burden of proof was very difficult to sustain, especially after the
Columbia Steel decision in which the Supreme Court established a
broad rule of reason test for mergers 82
There are two other statutes that could have been used to apply
antitrust principles to bank mergers: the National Bank Consolidation
Act of 1918" and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act."
Although each provided for banking agency review of mergers, neither
established standards as to the competitive nature or results of the
combinations. Furthermore, since neither the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency nor the FDIC had had much experience in the merger area, and
since neither was particularly equipped to give adequate consideration
to it, promotion of competition was never a strong factor in the public
interest standard applied by these agencies."
Finally, the Federal Reserve Board, in Section 11 of the Clayton
Act, was given authority to enforce compliance with those sections of
the Act which were "applicable to banks, banking associations, and trust
companies.' The first time the Board used that power in connection
with mergers was in 1948, when it filed a complaint charging Trans-
america Corporation with a violation of section 7 for its systematic
29 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 378 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
so S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; Casson & Burrus, supra note 16,
at 682. One of the reasons for this is that federal law generally prohibits member banks
of the Federal Reserve System from directly purchasing corporate stock of affiliates.
12 U.S.C. § 371c (1970).
31 United States v. Firstamerica Corp., Civil No. 38139 (ND. Cal. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 928 (1960).
82 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
33 12 U.S.C. §§ 215-15b (Sapp. 1972).
84 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
83 See S. Rep. No. 196, 8fith Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1959) ; Casson & Burrus, supra
note 16, at 682.
86 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970).
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acquisition of independent banks over a five-state area. In 1952 the
Board entered an order requiring substantial divestiture. On appeal,
the Board was reversed." However, an important point of the decision
was that the appellate court rejected Transamerica's argument that
section 7 was not applicable to banks. Transamerica argued that Con-
gress had always used special banking legislation to regulate banks
and that it did not mean to depart from this practice with the Clayton
Act. The court held that section 7 did apply even though it was "doubt-
less true that the members of Congress in enacting Section 7 of the
Clayton Act in 1914 did not specifically contemplate that 'corporations
engaged in commerce' would include banks."" Although Transamerica's
bank acquisitions were upheld, the court's reasoning on the applicability
of section 7 was an omen of things to come.
1. The Effect of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment
In the late 1940's Congress became concerned about the growing
trend toward industrial concentration in general and amended the
Clayton Act in 1950 to read:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly,
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
At the time it was generally thought that the phrase "subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission" exempted banks
from application of the asset provision, since Section 11 of the Act
specifically gave jurisdiction over banks to the Federal Reserve Board.
Legislators, the banking agencies and even the Attorney General and
heads of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice subscribed
to this theory.'" The well-known Kaysen and Turner book, Antitrust
Policy," written in 1959, included banks in its list of industries exempt
from the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the Report of the Attorney Gen-
87 Transamerica Corp. v. FRB, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901
(1953).
88 206 F.2d at 166.
88 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added).
40 Hearings on S. 3911 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61, 84 (1956); Hearings on S. 1062 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
41 C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy—An Economic and Legal Analysis 42
(1959).
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eves Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,42 an authoritative review
of the scope of the antitrust laws, gave no special attention to bank
mergers. The position of most observers before 1960 was summarized
by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
Stanley Barnes, in his testimony on a proposal before Congress to amend
Section 7 of the Clayton Act to apply to banks. Barnes testified:
The pending proposal would plug a loophole left by present
section 7's failure to cover asset acquisition by banks. On the
one hand, that provision's stock acquisition bar applies to all
corporations "engaged in commerce." Section 7's acquisition
portion, in sharp contrast, covers only corporations "subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission."
Further, section 11 of the Clayton Act exempts banks from
Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction by specifying that
"authority to enforce compliance" with section 7 "is hereby
vested . . . in the Federal Reserve Board where applicable
to banks, banking associations and trust companies." On the
basis of these provisions this Department has concluded that
asset acquisition by banks is not covered by section 7 as
amended in 1950.43
2. Bank Merger Trend
As mentioned above, a strong bank merger trend developed in
the early 1950's and became especially strong after 1954.44 From 1950
to 1958, 1,300 bank combinations involving over 26 billion dollars
occurred." Yet even more alarming than the total number of mergers
were the dramatic combinations of nationally known banks. In 1955 the
Chase National Bank, with assets of 5.7 billion dollars, merged with
both the Bank of Manhattan Company, with assets of 1.6 billion
dollars, and the Bronx County Trust Company, with assets of 76 million
dollars. The Antitrust Division made an investigation of this merger
but concluded "that this Department would not have jurisdiction to
proceed under section 7 of the Clayton Act."46
 Then Bankers Trust,
42
 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
(1955). This may be attributed to the lack of case law on the application of the antitrust
laws to bank mergers. See Section on Antitrust of ABA, Antitrust Developments 1955-
1968, at 90-91 n.4 (1968).
45
 Hearings on H.R. 5948 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
44 Shull & Horvitz, supra note 5, at 868.
45
 Hearings on S. 1062 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1959).
40 Hearings on Current Antitrust Problems Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2141 (1955); see also Interim Re-
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with 2.3 billion dollars in assets, acquired Public National with over
500 million dollars in assets; and National City Bank, with over
6 billion dollars in assets, acquired First National with 715 million
dollars in assets. In 1956, the West Coast picked up the trend as the
Crocker National Bank, with assets of 1.5 billion dollars, acquired
the Anglo National Bank with 1 billion dollars in assets. By 1960,
the four largest banks in each of the sixteen most important financial
centers of the country controlled sixty percent of all bank assets in
those centers.'" The most startling fact subsequently discovered by
Congress was that most of these mergers needed no federal approval
whatsoever." It was even possible for banks to avoid review by any
of the three banking agencies." For instance, the Federal Reserve Board
could review a merger only if it would create a member bank with a
smaller capital or surplus than the combined capital or surplus of the
banks involved in the transaction, and it would be an unusual merger
that produced such a result." Similarly the FDIC could not review
mergers of FDIC-insured state banks that were not members of the
Federal Reserve System unless the total capital stock or surplus of the
resulting or assuming bank was less than the aggregate capital stock
or aggregate surplus, respectively, of all the merging or consolidating
banks or all of the parties to the assumptions of the liabilities.61 Finally,
if a national bank purchased assets and assumed liabilities of another
bank, the Comptroller's approval was not directly required unless the
capital stock or surplus of the assuming bank would be less than the
aggregate capital stock or surplus of the combining banks." Thus it
became apparent that something had to be done.
I.T. BANK MERGER ACT OF 1960
A. Legislative History
Legislation to deal with these combinations was proposed in Con-
gress throughout the 1950's. In 1956 seven different proposals were
introduced." Four bills sought to bring acquisitions of businesses not
port of the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 34 (1955).
47 105 Cong. Rec. 8114 (1959).
48
 See Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 Ind. L. J. 287,
298 (1962).
48
 See Waxberg & Robinson, Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: A
Need for Legislative Revision, 82 Banking L. J. 377, 385 (1965).
60 H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960).
51 Id. at 8.
52 Id, at 6.
53 Mogel, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 17 Am. U.L. Rev. 57, 58 (1967).
See also Funk, Antitrust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 Banking L.J. 369, 372-74
(1958).
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subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC—a category which everyone
at that time thought included banks—within the scope of section 7; "
two would have prevented bank acquisitions that would "reduce com-
petition substantially"; " and one would have set up standards for
judging whether the merger was in the public interest." This last bill
was introduced by Senator Robertson and might be considered the
parent of the Bank Merger Act of 1960.' 7
 It required the banking
agencies to consider six noncompetitive or banking factors as well as
"whether the effect thereof (of the merger) may be to lessen competi-
tion unduly or to tend unduly to create a monopoly . . .." The "unduly"
qualification was criticized on the ground that it would allow the bank-
ing agencies too much discretion and, as Senator Douglas argued, there
is a "tendency for regulatory agencies to be more or less taken over
. . . by the industries which they are supposed to regulate."" Senator
Robertson's bill died along with the others but was introduced in
1957; it passed the Senate but never reached the floor of the House."
In 1959 the bill, fortified with a provision for a Justice Department
opinion on the competitive effects of the proposed merger, again passed
the Senate." The next year the House passed a similar version which
eventually became the Bank Merger Act of 1960."
B. The Provisions of the Bank Merger Act
The Bank Merger Act of 1960 gave the three banking agencies
approval rights over mergers among banks in their jurisdiction: the
Federal Reserve Board was given authority over the state member
banks, the FDIC over the state nonmember banks, and the Comptroller
of the Currency over the national banks. This meant that approximately
ninety-five percent of the banks in the United States were required to
seek federal approval if they wished to merge." The regulatory agencies
had to consider two sets of factors, competitive and banking. The bank-
ing factors were (1) the financial history and condition of each of the
banks involved; (2) the adequacy of its structure; (3) its future
earning prospects; (4) the general character of its management; (5) the
54
 S. 3341, S. 3424, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 5948, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955); and H.R. 9424, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
55
 H.R. 2115, H.R. 6405, 84th Cong., 1st Sass. (1955).
55 S. 3911, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
57
 Mogel, supra note 53, at 58.
59 103 Cong. Rec. 3706 (1957).
59 S. 3911, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
59 S. 1062, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
61
 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. 1828(c) (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)
(Supp. 1971).
62 H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960); S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1959).
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convenience and needs of the community to be served; and (6) whether
or not the bank's corporate powers were consistent with the purpose
of this Act. The competitive factor was simply defined as the effect
of the transaction on competition including any tendency toward mo-
nopoly.° The original Robertson bill's term "unduly" had been dropped
along the way." The agency was not to approve the transaction unless,
considering all of such factors, it found a transaction to be in the public
interest.° Although this standard provided more guidance concerning
merger approval than had ever before been given the banking agencies,
it still did not spell out the weight that was to be given to each factor,
and the legislative history on this point was confused and not very
instructive. However, it can safely be said that most legislators agreed
with the sentiment of the House Report on the bill that concluded
"[s]ome bank mergers are in the public interest, even though they
lessen competition to a degree.""
As a result of this ambiguity, the three banking agencies developed
different policies in applying the criteria set up in the statute." The
Comptroller of the Currency followed a "balanced banking structure"
policy .° This stressed the range of bank size. It was thought that each
market should have a range of small, medium and large banks. The
FDIC stressed a "strengthening of competition" concept.° According
to this criterion, disparity in bank sizes was to be avoided. Finally,
the Federal Reserve Board followed a "variety of banking services"
doctrine." The Board felt that a broad range of banking services
should be available to the public and was less concerned than the
FDIC about the size of the banks in the particular market. 71
It is interesting to note that although the agencies differed in
their criteria for approval, they reached the same result: overwhelming
approval of bank mergers. In the five-year period from 1960 to 1965,
almost nine hundred bank merger applications were reviewed by the
three banking agencies and only thirty-one were denied." A survey of
the applications for 1963 revealed that more than two-thirds of the
proposed mergers were deemed by the Department of Justice to have
68 12 U.S.C.	 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970).
04 Id.
06 Id.
60 H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960). See Shull & Horvitz, The
Bank Merger Act of 1960; A Decade After, 16 Antitrust Bull. 859, 867 (1971).
6T Mogel, supra note 53, at 60-61.
68 G. Hall & C. Phillips, Bank Mergers & the Regulatory Agencies—Application of
the Bank Merger Act of 1960, at 37 (1964).
68 Id. at 51.
70 Id. at 63.
71 Id.
72 See Cohen, The Antitrust Laws Applied to Bank Mergers, Reciprocity and Tie-in
Arrangements, 26 Bus. Law. 1, 2 (1970).
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anticompetitive effects." It became obvious that the Department of
Justice and the banking agencies were speaking two different languages.
The Department was using straight antitrust principles which em-
phasized the protection of competition over the protection of competi-
tors, while the banking agencies were concerned with and attuned to
the problems of the banks or the "competitors" themselves.
While it is understandable that the agencies did not reach the
same results as the Department, one might ask whether the extraordi-
nary rate of bank merger approval reached by the agencies was the
result Congress had intended when it passed the Bank Merger Act of
1960. The impetus for the Act had been congressional concern over
the reduction in the number of banks, which had caused an increase
in the concentration of banking assets in numerous markets. There was
also fear that financing would become unavailable to small business,
arising from the assumption that larger banks would be less inclined to
deal sympathetically with small borrowers," many of whom rely on
reputation in the community for credit. It is doubtful, then, that anyone
in Congress had anticipated the agencies' wholesale approval of bank
merger applications. As one critic from within the industry put it,
"[I] n the years since the Bank Merger Act of 1960 became operative
the bank' supervisory agencies, especially the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, have demonstrated that they are merger happy. They almost
never see a bad merger.'"
He was not the only one concerned with the bank agency situation.
Citing "a lack of coordination of action and procedures among the
Federal agencies charged with responsibility for the regulation of
banks," President Johnson in 1964 directed the Secretary of the
Treasury "to establish procedures which will insure that every effort
is made by these agencies to act in concert and compose their dif-
ferences."7° The Comptroller himself complained that "with the admin-
istrative approach to bank mergers in such a state of conflict, it is
virtually impossible for a reasonably prudent banker to plan intelligently
for future expansion."'" As a result, the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General created an Interdepartmental Committee on Bank
Mergers in which all four agencies were represented." By this time,
though, the Department of Justice had filed its own suits to enjoin
73 Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 49, at 384.
74 See Shull & Horvitz, supra note 66, at 865.
75 The President of the independent Bankers Assn., Philadelphia Bulletin, September
23, 1965, at 28, col. 1.
78 BNA Daily Report for Executives, Mar. 19, 1964, at A7-A8.
77 1963 Comp. Curr. Ann. Rep. 187.
78 BNA Antirust & Trade Reg. Rep. No, 143, Apr. 7, 1964, at A-12.
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mergers that had been approved by the banking agencies, and the
Comptroller in turn was seeking to intervene to oppose the Department
of justice." It was apparent that the system was not healthy.
The Justice Department suits brought before the courts many ques-
tions concerning the Bank Merger Act of 1960. The first was whether
the Act preclued the Department from suing under the antitrust laws.
There had been references in both Houses to the fact that the bill
"would not affect in any way the applicability of the Sherman Act to
bank mergers or consolidations." 8° This statement was not much of a
concession, though, since the 1948 Supreme Court decision in Co-
lumbia Steels' was considered to have emasculated the Sherman Act
insofar as capacity to deal with mergers was concerned. Furthermore, as
noted above, most people felt that the Clayton Act had little significance
with respect to bank mergers since it was thought to apply only to
stock acquisition, a method of merging which could easily be avoided
by banks. In fact, the idea of the Justice Department's attacking bank
mergers was probably not seriously considered by any of the drafters
of the Act and, as mentioned earlier, the idea was rejected by the Justice
Department itself for a long time.82
The unscrambling of the regulatory scheme, therefore, was left
to the courts. This situation is not unusual. Many times the legislative
process produces ambiguities that force the courts to define the law.88
In these circumstances there may not be any "true intent" to a bill,
and the court will be forced to choose from among a number of practical
alternatives. Since courts are called upon to resolve actual disputes, it
is generally less easy for them to avoid difficult questions by resorting
to ambiguous draftsmanship; the result which a court may reach in
interpreting an ambiguous statute may, of course, be one which was
entirely unforeseen by the legislature. It should be noted, however, that
the Supreme Court, in its opinions on bank mergers, did not seem to find
the choices as difficult to make as they were for Congress and bankers
to accept.
79 Before the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the Comptroller had consistently been denied
the right to intervene. See, e.g., United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'I Bank, Civil No.
41808 (N.D. Cal.), order denying Comptroller's motion to intervene, March 23, 1964.
80 S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1416,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
81 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
82 See text at note 40 supra.
88 Judicial recognition of this principle can be found in Justice Douglas' opinion in
United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 367 (1967): "The 1966 [Bank
Merger] Act was the product of powerful contending forces, each of which in the
aftermath claimed more of a victory than it deserved, leaving the controversies that
finally abated in Congress to be finally resolved in the courts."
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III. ROUND ONE: THE COURT AND BANK MERGERS
While the decision in Transamerica Corporation" gave notice that
Section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to banks, the decision in the first
Justice Department bank merger suit, United States v. Firstamerica
Corp.,86
 gave notice that the Department of Justice and the courts were
not going to defer to the jurisdiction of banking agencies in approval
of bank mergers. Justice filed suit in March 1959, charging that the
acquisition of California Bank by Firstamerica, the bank holding
company, violated both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the Federal Reserve Board had already approved the merger and
that it had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Clayton Act.
The court denied the motion" and the Supreme Court denied a petition
for certiorari. This rejection of the concept that banking agencies had
exclusive or primary jurisdiction over bank mergers was to set the
theme for government suits and subsequent court decisions during the
year that followed the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1960.
A. Philadelphia National Bank
After the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was signed into law, the
Justice Department quickly dispelled any doubt about its intention of
continuing to sue under the antitrust laws. It filed five bank merger
suits in 1961, 87
 the first of which was United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank.
The Comptroller of the Currency had approved this merger after
receiving the three reports required by the Bank Merger Act of 1960
from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of
Justice.88
 All three reports found that the merger would have anti-
competitive effects. The Comptroller, however, reasoned that "since
there will remain an adequate number of alternative sources of banking
services in Philadelphia, and in view of the beneficial effects of this
84
 Transamerica Corp. v. FRB, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901
(1953). See text at note 37 supra.
" United States v. Firstamerica Corp., Civil No. 38139 (N.D. Cal. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 928 (1960).
86 Id.
87
 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Civil No. 61-C-3194 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Sept. 8, 1961) ; United States v. Continental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Civil No.
61-C-1441 (ND. Ill., filed Aug. 29, 1961) ; United States v. Bank Stack Corp., Civil No.
61-C-54 (E.D. Wis., filed Mar. 2, 1961) ; United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
Civil No. Lex. 1424 (ED. Ky., filed Mar. 1, 1961), United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, Civil No. 29287 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 25, 1961).
88
 The purpose of these reports was to give uniformity to the judgments of the
banking agencies, although such interagency agreement rarely occurred. See text at notes
67-79 supra.
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consolidation upon international and national competition it was con-
cluded that the overall effect upon competition would not be unfavor-
able."" He concluded that the new bank "would be far better able
to serve the convenience and needs of its community by being of
material assistance to its city and state in their efforts to attract new
industry and to retain existing industry."" The day after the Comp-
troller had approved the merger the Justice Department filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, charging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The district court agreed with the Justice Department that it was
entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, holding that the Bank Merger
Act of 1960 did not repeal by implication the antitrust laws insofar as
they applied to bank mergers. It also agreed that the product market
or "line of commerce" involved was "commercial banking." After that,
however, the court and the Justice Department parted company. The
court held section 7 inapplicable to bank mergers accomplished through
acquisition of assets on the ground that banks are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. Even assuming that
section 7 was applicable, the court found that the four-county Phila-
delphia metropolitan area delineated by the Government was not the
proper geographic market; moreover, even assuming that it was, there
still was no reasonable probability that competition among commercial
banks in the area would be substantially lessened as a result of the
merger. As to the Sherman Act charge, the court found that since the
merger did not violate the Clayton Act, a fortiori it did not violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On appeal the defendants did not contest the adverse findings of
the district court regarding the line of commerce and the right of Justice
to sue under antitrust laws, but concentrated on supporting those rulings
favorable to it." Both parties emphasized the alleged Sherman Act
violation and paid little attention to the section 7 case." Ironically,
however, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of violation of
the Sherman Act, since in a decision that stunned the banking com-
munity it found that the "merger of appellees is forbidden by § 7 of
the Clayton Act and so must be enjoined . . . ."98
 Justice Brennan's
opinion was a tour de force for which very few lawyers, congressmen
or, for that matter, anyone was prepared. The main points made in the
89
 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 333 (1963).
90 Id.
91
 Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 15, 24 (1967).
92 Id. The Government did not even discuss the section 7 charge in its reply brief.
98 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1963).
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decision, together with a summary of the Court's reasoning on each
point, are as follows:
1. Bank mergers through asset acquisitions are subject to Section
7 of the Clayton Act.--The Court found a congressional desire to em-
brace bank mergers in the legislative history of the statute. It reasoned
that the Celler-Kefauver Amendment was designed to close the loop-
holes that had allowed mergers. In order to close these loopholes,
Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give section 7
a reach which would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations,
from pure stock acquisitions to pure asset acquisitions, within the scope
of section 7. To reach this conclusion the Court read together the
stock acquisition and asset acquisition portions of section 7. Approached
in this manner, section 7 would apply to mergers "which fit neither
category perfectly but lie somewhere between the two ends of the
spectrum."" This interpretation then limited the application of the
qualifying phrase "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission," which had previously been thought to exclude bank
mergers, to straight asset acquisitions when not accomplished by
merger. The Court went on to give reasons why this construction was
the only possible interpretation of the section: (1) any other interpre-
tation would create a large loophole in a statute designed to close
loopholes; (2) Congress was aware of the difference between a merger
and a pure purchase of assets, and its intent was to cover mergers;
(3) the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission" was meant to make explicit the role of the FTC in adminis-
tering the section and was not meant to undercut the dominant
purpose of eliminating the difference in treatment accorded stock
acquisitions and mergers by the original section 7 as construed; and
(4) immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly to be implied.
The Court realized that its construction of the amended section 7
was different from that voiced by some members of Congress and, for
a time, the Justice Department. Yet it noted that the "views of a sub-
sequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one."" It stressed also that there were no Supreme Court opin-
ions upon which these subsequent views were based and which there-
fore might bind the Court in this opinion. It concluded: "[t]he design
fashioned in the Bank Merger Act was predicated upon uncertainties
to the scope of § 7, and we do no violence to that design by dispelling
the uncertainty.""
2. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not preclude application of
94 Id. at 342.
95 Id. at 348-49, citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
90 374 U.S. at 349.
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the antitrust laws.—The Court noted that no express immunity was
conferred by the Act and, as mentioned above, repeals of the antitrust
laws by implications are strongly disfavored. Furthermore, it found
that Congress did not embrace the view that the banking regulation
was so pervasive that the enforcement of the antitrust laws would be
unnecessary or disruptive. It noted that the primary jurisdiction of
the banking agency, if there were any, would not bar jurisdiction of
the courts but would only postpone it. But here primary jurisdiction
was not a problem, since the appropriate agency had already acted.
The Court went on to state that it would be anomalous to conclude
that Congress, while intending that the Sherman Act remain fully
applicable to bank mergers and that section 7 apply to pure stock
acquisitions by banks, nevertheless intended section 7 to be completely
inapplicable to bank mergers.
3. The merger is in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.—
The Court had "no difficulty" in finding that the "line of commerce"
or product market was the "cluster of products and services" or "com-
mercial banking," and that the "section of the country" or geographic
market was the four-county area advocated by the Justice Department.
It declared that the standard for determining a geographic market was
"where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger
on competition will be direct and immediate."' The Court noted that
the four-county area was a market "which state law apparently recog-
nizes as a meaningful banking community . . . and which would seem
roughly to delineate the area in which bank customers that are neither
very large nor very small find it practical to do their banking busi-
ness ...."" As to the standard for determining the probable competitive
effects of a bank merger, the Court stated, "[NV] e think that a merger
which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in the significant increase in the concen-
tration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competi-
tion substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompeti-
tive effects."' To the Court, Philadelphia National Bank's market share
of thirty percent clearly presented a threat of undue concentration. It
also noted that the increase of thirty-three percent in the concentration
of the market as a result of the merger was significant. Finally, it de-
fended its conclusion that Philadelphia National Bank's percentage
share raised an inference of anticompetitive effects even though neither
the terms of Section 7 nor the legislative history of the Act suggested
°T Id. at 359.
99 Id. at 361.
99 Id. at 363.
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that any particular percentage share was deemed critical by Congress.
4. Affirmative Defenses.—The Court rejected all three of the
defendant's affirmative defenses:
a. The only way to follow customers to the suburbs is by branch-
ing through mergers. The Court made short shrift of this argument by
indicating the alternative is de novo branching and that "surely one
premise of an antimerger statute such as § 7 is that corporate growth
by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition." 1°°
b. Enlarged lending limits as a result of the merger would allow
the bank to compete with large out-of-state banks. The Court rejected
this "application of 'countervailing power,' " stating that "if anticom-
petitive effects in one market could be justified by pro-competitive con-
sequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in
an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers
that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader."' In the
city of Philadelphia the result would be that only one bank would re-
main, since all the banks combined would still be smaller than the
largest bank in New York City.
c. Philadelphia needs a bank larger than it now has in order to
bring industry to the area and to stimulate economic development. The
Court responded to this contention with a straight antitrust analysis:
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may
be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because,
on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits, it may be deemed beneficial .... Congress determined
to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore
proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malig-
nant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price might
have to be paid.'"
This argument proved more disturbing than any other to critics of
the decision and the banking industry, since it had been thought that
the Bank Merger Act of 1960, if it did nothing else, provided the
modest concession that some mergers were to be allowed even if they
had anticompetitive effects.'"
Undoubtedly Justice Brennan's opinion was an example of ingeni-
ous and skillful reasoning. Yet, as two critics observed, "The Court's
100 Id. at 370.
r.or. Id .
102 Id. at 371.
103 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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legal analysis was designed to justify an overriding policy decision,
not to aid in determining the appropriate result.'uos
After the initial shock, there followed a virtual flood of criticism
attacking the opinion,'" much of it foreshadowed in Justice Harlan's
well-reasoned dissenting opinion. However, there is no need to go into
those criticisms here. The point to remember is that the Supreme Court
served notice that the antitrust laws were to be applied to bank mergers
and that this industry was not going to be treated differently from
any other, notwithstanding the Bank Merger Act of 1960. Justice
Harlan was not exaggerating when he said that the result of Phila-
delphia Bank was "that the Bank Merger Act is almost completely
B. Lexington Bank
The Lexington Bank 107
 case was filed one month after the Phila-
delphia Bank case. For some reason the Justice Department did not
include a section 7 count, but relied solely on the Sherman Act in its
complaint. Had it done otherwise, the Supreme Court might never have
decided the applicability of the Sherman Act, since this case, like
Philadelphia Bank, could have been won or lost on the easier section 7
standard.
The merger in a question was a consolidation of two commercial
banks based in Lexington, Kentucky. The two banks were ranked first
and fourth in total assets, deposits and loans among the commercial
banks in the geographic market, which was determined to be Fayette
County, Kentucky. The two banks also held ninety-four percent of all
trust assets, ninety-two percent of all trust earnings and seventy-nine
percent of all trust accounts in that county. After consolidation, the
bank was bigger than all the remaining commercial banks in a market
where the five largest banks together held ninety-nine percent of the
total deposits. The Comptroller of the Currency, as in Philadelphia
Bank, received adverse reports on the competitive effects from the
FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board and the Justice Department. Never-
theless, he approved the merger. The Justice Department filed suit two
days after the Comptroller's approval, on the same day that the merger
was effected.
1 " Scarfs & Reasoner, The Bank Merger Act of 1966—Its Strange and Fruitless
Odyssey, 25 Bus. Law. 133, 137 (1969).
lox See, e,g., Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159,
173-78 (1963) ; The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 159-63
(1963); Comment, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 990 (1964) ; Note, 42 Texas L. Rev. 99 (1963).
100 374 U.S. at 384 (dissenting opinion).
107 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
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The district court, after a trial on the matter, dismissed the Gov-
ernment's suit, holding that no violation of either Section 1 or Section 2
of the Sherman Act had been shown. 108 The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court on the section 1 count and never reached the section 2
monopolization charge.
The principal significance of the case was that the Court brushed
aside its Columbia Steel criteria and relied on a "major competitive
factor" theory. In Columbia Steel the Court had said:
In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do
not think the dollar value is in itself of compelling signifi-
cance; we look rather to the percentage of business controlled,
the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action
springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize,
the probable development of the industry, consumer demands,
and other characteristics of the market. We do not undertake
to prescribe any set of percentage figures by which to measure
the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement of its activi-
ties by the purchase of the assets of a competitor. The relative
effect of percentage command of a market varies with the set-
ting in which that factor is placed.'"
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, declared that "The Columbia
Steel case must be confined to its special facts."'" Yet he noted that
even if the Columbia Steel criteria were considered in the instant case,
they would urge the conclusion that the merger was unlawful. Douglas
concluded: "where, as here, the merging companies are major competi-
tive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of significant competi-
tion between them constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." 121
In support of this proposition he did not provide any independent rea-
soning but relied solely upon four railroad merger cases decided at the
turn of the century. He found that the "major competitive factor"
standard derived from those cases was met in the present case in view
of the fact that the two banks in question had such a large share of
the relevant market.
Justice Brennan and Justice White concurred in the result but
would have relied solely on the conclusion that the factors relied on in
Columbia Steel clearly compelled the reversal. Justice Harlan, joined
by 'Justice Stewart, dissented, declaring that the opinion amounted "to
an invocation of formulas of antitrust numerology and a presumption
108 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
109 United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1950).
110 376 U.S. at 672.
111 Id. at 672-73 (emphasis added).
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that in the antitrust field good things come usually, if not always, in
small packages."112
After Lexington Bank, it was almost as easy to enjoin a merger
under the Sherman Act as under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Although
it may be true that, as Justice Harlan predicted, this case was "doomed
to be a novelty in the reports,""" it nevertheless is a significant decision
because, as one observer noted, it demonstrated "not merely that the
Court does not accept, but that apparently it is actually hostile to, any
attempted construction of banking statutes which would tend to inhibit
the application of the antitrust laws to banking." 14
IV. ROUND Two: CONGRESS AND THE BANK MERGER ACT
or 1966
A. Legislative History115
The Philadelphia Bank decision, as discussed above, caused con-
siderable concern both in Congress and in the banking industry. HO
Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, who had been one of the principal authors of the Bank
Merger Act of 1960, was among the first to complain that the decision
did not come close to reflecting congressional intent. 117
 Bankers were
upset because it not only presented problems for future bank mergers
but also threatened the legality of approximately two thousand bank
mergersin that had occurred since the 1950 amendment of the Clayton
Act.11° Furthermore, two bank merger litigations, which had commenced
before the Philadelphia Bank decision, were going to be seriously
sleeted.'" Needless to say, these banks also had lobbyists pushing for
legislative relief.
To resolve these problems, Senator Robertson introduced a bill to
amend the Bank Merger Act of 1960 and radically alter the Philadelphia
112 Id. at 673-74 (dissenting opinion),
112
 Id. at 673.
114
 Seeley, Banks and Antitrust, 21 Bus. Law. 917, 921 (1966).
115
 For discussions of the legislative history of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, see
Lifland, supra note 91, at 28-31; Scads & Reasoner, supra note 104, at 139-41.
110 As mentioned above, criticism was not limited to bankers and legislators. See
note 105 supra and accompanying text. The Comptroller of the Currency's Office also
produced papers critical of the decision. See Motter, Comments on the Philadelphia-
Girard Decision, 1 Nat'l Banking Rev. 89 (1963). (The National Banking Review was a
quarterly journal published by the Comptroller's office and was discontinued in 1967.)
117 See 109 Cong. Rec. 11,097 (1963).
ITS S. Rep. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
110 The threat to these mergers was not imaginary since the Justice Department, in
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), filed suit 30
years after the particular acquisition was made,
122 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Civil No. (S.D.N.Y., filed
Sept. 8, 1961); United States v. Continental EL Bank & Trust Co., 1961 Trade Cas.
lf 70,110 (NM. III. 1961).
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Bank result."' It would (1) give the banking agencies "exclusive and
plenary authority to approve mergers, consolidations, acquisitions of
stock or assets and assumptions of liabilities" and would immunize ap-
proved transactions from suits under the antitrust laws; and (2) give
immunity from future prosecution under the antitrust laws to insured
banks which had merged before the passage of the Bank Merger Act
of 1960.122 This bill was supported by the American Bankers Associa-
tion and the majority of state banking associations. The banking
agencies also appeared to be in favor of it. However, the Independent
Bankers Association, which did not believe in the proposition that all
bank mergers were for the good, wanted a provision inserted that would
allow the Justice Department to sue within a limited period of time after
the merger had been approved by a federal banking agency. Accord-
ingly, Senator Proxmire introduced a "now or never" amendment, a
major compromise, which was accepted."'
When the bill went over to the House it ran into a formidable
roadblock in the person of Congressman Wright Patman, Chairman
of the House Banking and Currency Committee. An indication of the
fight the banking interests would face was his first reaction to the bill:
"If you exempt banks from antitrust, you might as well also shoot the
policeman at the corner.'" He sought to delay hearings on the bill
in order to drum up opposition to it. Meanwhile, Congressman Ashley
introduced another measure that would require bank agency hearings
with court of appeals review."' The Department of Justice objected to
this proposal as unnecessary, since in the vast majority of applications
there were no serious antitrust problems and, when there were such
problems, the public disclosure of pertinent financial data would not
be appropriate for review of bank mergers.' 2° Congressman Ashley,
with Congressman Ottinger, then revised the bill to allow for suits by
the Justice Department at any time. However, the revision also provided
that a merger which would violate the antitrust laws was to be approved
if its adverse competitive effect would be clearly outweighed by its
ability to meet the convenience and needs of the community involved.
Although compromises were being made to gain support for the
bill, Chairman Patman was not interested. He did not envision a need
for any bank merger bill and was not interested in furthering the pro-
gress of the two before him. He delayed so long in holding hearings
121 S. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See Lifland, supra note 91, at 28-29.
122 S. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
122 See S. Rep. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1963).
124 New York Herald Tribune, May 19, 1965, at 32, col. 1.
126 H.R. 11,011, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1966).
126 H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Seas, 8-10 (1966) (letter from Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach to Rep. Wright Patman, Sept. 24, 1965).
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that Congressman Ashley, with a majority of the Banking Committee,
convened a session of the Committee without informing him. He was
furious when he learned of the meeting and ordered it disbanded. The
majority rebuffed him and reported out the Ashley-Ottinger Bill.'
Immediately both Congressman Patman and Congressman Reuss,
another key committee member, took the position that the meeting
was a rump session held without sanction and that therefore the bill
was defective.'" Congressman Reuss then requested both the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Treasury to comment on proposals
he was going to submit.'" He adopted these comments into his amend-
ment, and it appeared that a floor fight might result between the Reuss
and Ashley-Ottinger proposals. To avoid such a fight, the proponents
of the Ashley-Ottinger bill agreed to further compromises, and Con-
gressman Patman, who was against the bill "as a matter of principle,"130
agreed to introduce it. It was passed in toto by the House and Senate
and was signed by the President.
B. Bank Merger Act—Main Provisions
The important provisions of the Act, all in Section 1828(c),"
may be summarized as follows:
(1) Subsection 1 provides that no insured bank may
merge or consolidate in any manner without the approval of
the banking agency having jurisdiction over it.
(2) Subsection 4 requires that reports on the competitive
factors be sought from the Attorney General and the other
two banking agencies unless the agency feels that it must
act immediately in order to prevent the probable failure of
one of the banks.
(3) Subsection 5 establishes standards for agency ap-
proval. An agency may not approve—
(A) any proposed merger or transaction which would
result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance
of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or at-
tempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part
of the United States, or
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect
in any section of the country may be substantially to
127 See Lifland, supra note 91, at 30; H.R. Rep. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 248, Apr. 12, 1966, at 13-2.
128 Brief for Comptroller, app. B (Press Release of Rep. Patman, Oct. 21, 1966),
United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
129 H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1966).
120 112 Cong. Rec. 2464 (1966).
181 12 U.S.C, § 1828(c) (1970).
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lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade,
unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community
to be served.
(4) Under subsection 6, a merger may not be consum-
mated before the thirtieth calendar day after the date of the
approval by the agency, except in emergencies.
(5) Subsection 7 establishes that—
(A) a suit filed under the antitrust laws before the legal
date for consummation of the merger will stay the effective-
ness of the agency approval unless the court shall otherwise
specificially order. In a suit under the antitrust laws the court
shall review de novo the issues presented.
(B) in antitrust suits other than those under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, the standards applied by the court shall
be identical with, those that the banking agencies are directed
to apply.
(C) upon termination of an antitrust suit, or upon ex-
piration of the period in which antitrust suits may be filed, the
merger will be exempt from further antitrust suits except
those proceedings based on the theory that the merger alone
and of itself constituted a violation of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.
(D) any state or federal banking agency that has juris-
diction over the bank has a right to appear as a party of its
own motion and as of right in any antitrust suit that attacked
a bank merger approved by a federal banking agency.
The Act raised almost as many questions as it answered. Two
weeks before the Act became effective, The Wall Street Journal re-
marked:
And now, after months of comic parliamentary pratfalls
and fishwifely invective, the bank merger bill is about to pass.
Sure enough, it reasserts Congressional authority over the
subject. But that reassertion is so vaguely worded that the
Supreme Court inevitably will be asked to define what Con-
gress really meant, and the honorable justices will have con-
siderable leeway again to make their own law.
The incredible history of the bank merger bill demon-
236
REVIEW OF THE LAW OF BANK MERGERS
strates again just how hard it is for Congress to shape business
regulatory policy.132
The Act left the following questions for the Supreme Court's
ultimate decision:
(1) Whether the standards in section (5) (B) were to be pleaded
by the plaintiff to state a cause of action or established an affirmative
defense to a suit under the antitrust laws.
(2) What was the effect of the omission of the phrase "in any
line of commerce" in paragraph (5) (B)? Was it omitted in order to
eliminate the "commercial banking" line of commerce established in
Philadelphia Bank?
(3) Section (7)(A), which stated that an antitrust action shall
stay the approval of the merger "unless the court shall otherwise spe-
cifically order," raised the obvious question of what standard the court
should use in determining whether to dissolve the stay.
(4) What was the meaning of the phrase in section (7)(A)
providing that "the court shall review de novo the issues presented"?
"Review de novo" had no precedent in federal administrative statutes;
the usual expression was "try de novo." What, then, was the scope of
judicial review of federal banking agency approval?
(5) How were the agency and the court to apply the standards
set up in section (5)(B), and what weight was to be given to the
"convenience and needs of the community" in offsetting the anticom-
petitive effects of a merger?
The Act did resolve some points that had bothered both banks
and Congress. Mergers consummated prior to June 17, 1963, the date
of the Philadelphia Bank decision, were "conclusively presumed to have
not been in violation of any antitrust laws other than Section 2 [of the
Sherman Act7." 1" This gave immunity to those two thousand mergers
as well as to the Manufacturers-Hanover, Continental-Illinois and
Lexington Bank mergers. Mergers consummated after June 16, 1963
and not attacked by the time the Act went into effect, unless attacked
on a section 2 charge, were also immune. 134
 For mergers consummated
after Philadelphia Bank but before the Act went into effect, the courts
were to apply the standards set forth in the Act. The Proxmire "now
or never" provision summarized above gave banks immunity from suits
thirty days after agency approval. Furthermore, under the standards of
132 Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1966, at 16, col. 4.
133
 Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 2(a), 80 Stat. 7 (1966), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1964).
184 Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 2(b), 80 Stat. 7 (1966), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1964).
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subsection 5 (b), it was now impossible for the courts to ignore the
"convenience and needs" provisions of the Act; they could never say
again, as had Justice Brennan in Philadelphia Bank, that Congress
proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the "benign and the malignant
Because of the series of compromises made to gain support for
the bill, the banks did lose significant benefits provided in Senator
Robertson's original bill. There was no longer a provision for exclusive
jurisdiction in the banking agencies. Also, because of the automatic
stay provision, the banks could not slip a merger by an overworked
Justice Department. Finally, the competitive factor was elevated to
the rank of prime factor rather than being one factor among many, as
it had been under the Bank Merger Act of 1960. However, this change
was an improvement upon the Philadelphia Bank result that established
competition as the only factor in determining the legality of the merger.
V. ROUND THREE: THE COURTS TAKE OVER
Six lower court opinions were issued before the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to rule on the Bank Merger Act of 1966.' 38 These
six are interesting for the fact that of the eight judges that heard these
cases—a three-judge panel sat on the Cracker-Anglo case—not one
came close to the interpretation of the Act eventually reached by the
Supreme Court.'"
A. The Houston and Provident Decision"8
The first Supreme Court review of the 1966 Act decided two bank
merger cases in one opinion. Banks in Texas and Pennsylvania applied
to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval of bank mergers. In
what was a familiar scenario, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Attorney General both submitted adverse reports and the Comptroller
went ahead and approved the mergers. The United States filed civil
suits under Section 7 of the Clayton Act in both Texas and Pennsyl-
vania; the Comptroller intervened, under the authority of the Bank
Merger Act of 1966, and moved to dismiss the suits. The district courts
188 374 U.S. at 371.
180 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 1967 Trade Cas. I 71,970 (S.D. Tex.
1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 263 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 257 F. Supp. 591 (D.
Hawaii 1966); United States v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Mo. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 27 (1967); United States v. Provident Nat'l
Bank, 262 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1966), rev'd sub. nom. United States v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 869
(M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
137 See Searls & Reasoner, supra note 104, at 147.
138 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
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dismissed the complaints," 9 and the Government appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court opinion discussed four major questions con-
cerning the Act: (1) the burden of pleading; (2) the burden of proof;
(3) the scope of review; and (4) the standards for determining whether
to lift the statutory stay. It was a rare Supreme Court bank merger
opinion for two reasons. The first was that it was unanimous; in fact,
it has thus far proved to be the only unanimous Supreme Court bank
merger decision. The second was that it provoked little criticism.
The four procedural issues are of sufficient importance to justify
a brief summary of the Court's rulings:
(1) Pleading.—Defendants had contended that the complaints
were defective since they did not mention the Bank Merger Act of
1966 but cited only Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Justice Depart-
ment left out reference to the 1966 Act in order to place on the defen-
dants the burden of pleading and proof of the "convenience and needs"
issue.'" Quoting the language of the Act, the Court held that Congress
intended that an action challenging a bank merger on the grounds of its
anticompetitive effects should be brought under the antitrust laws and
not under the Bank Merger Act of 1966. The Court stated:
There is no indication that an action challenging a merger .. .
is bottomed on the Bank Merger Act rather than on the anti-
trust laws. What is apparent is that Congress intended that a
defense or justification be available once it had been deter-
mined that a transaction would have anticompetitive effects,
as judged by the standards normally applied in antitrust
actions."'
(2) Burden of Proof.—Concerning the question of whether the
burden of proof was on the defendant banks or on the Government to
establish that an anticompetitive merger fell within the "convenience
and needs of the community" exception of 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (5) (B),
the Court found it "plain that the banks carry the burden. That is the
general rule where one claims the benefits of an exception to the prohibi-
tion of a statute."'" In addition to this general rule argument, Justice
Douglas quoted from a statement Congressman Patman had made when
he introduced the bill, which would seem questionable support, since it
139 United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 262 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1966); the
lower court opinion in the Houston case was unreported. See 386 U.S. at 363.
140 otherwise the initial government investigation would have to be much more
thorough and the government would have to delay the filing of the suit or the trial date
in order to prepare to plead and prove this issue in its case in chief.
141 Id. at 364.
142 Id. at 366.
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was acknowledged by everyone, including Congressman Patman, that
he was a bitter enemy of the bill.'"
(3) Scope of Review.—The Court found no congressional intent
to change the administrative procedure spelled out in Philadelphia
Bank. In support of this finding the Court noted that Congress had
traditionally given antitrust suits different treatment from that generally
accorded other administrative review procedures. Furthermore, the Act
itself stated that the standards for the agency and the court review
should be the same. Its provision was not the conventional judicial
administrative review standard, which looks only to whether or not
the agency's decision is supported by the evidence. It appeared that the
phrase "review de novo" was an example of unfortunate draftman-
ship.144
 In any case the Court focused on the words "de novo" and
"issues presented" rather than on the ambiguous term "review."'"
It found that these two phrases indicated that an independent judicial
determination was desired by Congress. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the Comptroller's proceedings were informal and that no hearings
in the customary sense were held, since the 1966 Act did not require
the Comptroller to hold formal hearings. Therefore, to hold that there
should be only a conventional judicial review of the agency proceedings
would force the Court "to assume that Congress made a revolutionary
innovation by making administrative action well nigh conclusive, even
143 See text at note 130 supra. It has been argued that this burden will not be
harmful to the banks. The argument is that any bank, having thoroughly prepared the
bank merger application, should be ready to go forward with this type of evidence and
only if the evidence is evenly divided (which is rare) will the banks be hurt by this
burden. Furthermore, this will tend to speed the trial since the banks will be ready
sooner than the Government would if it had the burden. One might question whether
a speedy trial helps an antitrust defendant; normally it would not, but in a bank case
there will probably be an automatic stay already in effect and therefore any time
saved will be to the benefit of both the banks and the government. See Lifland, supra
note 91, at 35-36.
144 See SearIs & Reasoner, supra note 104, at 151. The phrase originated with the
Department of Justice. An exchange between Mr. Justice Fortas and the then Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division during the oral argument of the
case is instructive.
Mr. Justice Fortas: It may have been that these were words of legislative diplomacy
rather than words of legality.
Mr. Turner: I am afraid, Mr. Justice Fortes, it wasn't even that. If it were
held that the use of these words were decisive, I must say from
our standpoint it would have been one of the greatest Mad-
vertencies in history.
Mr. Justice Fortes: Maybe it was.
Transcript of Oral Argument in United States v. Provident Bank, No. 972, at 73-74
(Feb. 21, 1967).
145 386 U.S. at 368.
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though no hearing had been held and no record in the customary sense
created."'
The Court rejected the constitutional argument that to have the
Court judge the factors enumerated in the Bank Merger Act of 1966
would force the court to perform nonjudicial tasks. It noted the long
prevalent "rule of reason" approach in antitrust law in which appraisal
of competitive factors had always been "grist for the antitrust mill!" 4'
Consequently it held that no special weight should be given to the
agency approval and that "it is the court's judgment, not the Comp-
troller's, that finally determines whether the merger is legal." 148
(4) Standards on Dissolving the Automatic Stay.—The Court
was very firm on the point that a stay should not be dissolved except
under extraordinary conditions: "[Absentbsent a frivolous complaint by
the United States, which we presume will be infrequent, a stay is essen-
tial until the judicial remedies have been exhausted! 14° The Court noted
that the caption of the Act stated that it was designed "to establish a
procedure . . . to eliminate the necessity for the dissolution of merged
banks."18° Furthermore, it found the legislative history was "replete
with references to the difficulty of unscrambling two or more banks
after their merger!' Therefore "the normal procedure should be main-
tenance of the status quo until the antitrust litigation has run its course,
lest consummation take place and the unscrambling process that Con-
gress abhorred in the case of banks be necessary." 162
The Provident-Houston decision provoked little adverse reaction
and even some congressional endorsement."' One of the reasons for
this calm reception may have been that after the Philadelphia Bank
and Lexington Bank decisions most observers had prepared themselves
for the worst, or at least for a reaffirmation of the policies behind those
opinions. The Provident-Houston appeal had been concerned solely
with procedural issues; consequently the Court offered no views on
the merits of the mergers or on the justifications submitted in their
support. The very important questions concerning the meaning of the
"convenience and needs" defense and the circumstances under which
it would outweigh the anticompetitive effects of a merger were left for
later opinions to spell out.
145 Id.
147 Id. at 369.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 370.
180 Id.
151 Id. (emphasis in original).
182 Id. at 370-71 (emphasis in original).
155 See Lifland, supra note 91, at 38; American Banker, June 23, 1967, at 5, cols. 3-4.
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B. Nashville Bank
United States v. Third Nat'l Bankl" (hereinafter Nashville Bank)
was decided during the next Supreme Court term. The district court
had upheld the merger on the grounds that it would not tend to lessen
competition substantially, and, even assuming there were anticompeti-
tive effects, that they would be outweighed by the benefit to the con-
venience and needs of the community. The district court also found
that as a result of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the Philadelphia Bank
criteria for judging the anticompetitive effect of a merger were no longer
applicable, and it adopted the Columbia Steel standard."
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It reiterated that
Columbia Steel had been confined to its facts in Lexington Bank, and
that the Bank Merger Act of 1966 had not changed this restriction.
Therefore the straight antitrust Philadelphia Bank standard was to be
used in judging the anticompetitive effects of a merger. Judging the
proposed merger by that standard, the Court unanimously concluded
that the Nashville Bank merger was anticompetitive. The larger bank
had forty percent of the city's banking business, and the smaller bank,
which was not a failing concern, had previously been an important
competitive element in certain facets of city banking.
The most important point of the decision concerned the "conve-
nience and needs" defense. The Court set up a two-step process for
establishing this defense. The trial court would have to decide that
the benefit to "convenience and needs of the community" clearly out-
weighed the anticompetitive effect, but first it must find that the banks
had made a reasonable effort to solve the problems which they claimed
justified the merger, or at least find that such efforts would not have
been likely to succeed. In other words, the trial court in the first step
184 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
1" United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 869, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
The district court relied heavily on Justice Harlan's dissent in Lexington Bank, which ex-
pressed the view that Congress in the Bank Merger Act of 1960 had plainly indicated
that bank mergers should not be measured solely by the antitrust considerations which
are applied in the other industries and that the Columbia Steel standard "would leave
room for an accommodation within the framework of the antitrust laws of the special
features of banking recognized by Congress." 376 U.S. at 680. The court went on to state
that it was persuaded that
the accommodation to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred is the fundamental
purpose and effect of the 1966 amendment in providing that anticompetitive
effects may be outweighed in the public interest by the convenience and needs
of the community, and that consideration should be given in every case to the
qualitative banking factors specifically enumerated. These factors are sufficiently
comprehensive in character not only to embrace the Columbia Steel criteria,
but also to require an even broader scope of inquiry and analysis with respect
to antitrust issues.
260 F. Supp. at 877.
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must "sufficiently or reliably establish the unavailability of alternative
solutions."15°
Finally, the Court determined that since the district court had
not correctly analyzed the anticompetive effects of the merger, it could
not have properly weighed the countervailing benefits to the community.
Therefore the case was remanded for a new balancing of the competi-
tive and "convenience and needs" factors to determine whether the
merger was in the public interest.
C. Impact of Provident-Houston and Nashville Bank
Little remained of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 after these two
Supreme Court decisions. Although Justice White in Nashville Bank
had recognized that Congress "wished to alter both the procedures by
which the Justice Department challenges bank mergers and the legal
standard which courts apply in judging those mergers," 1 " the result of
both decisions was that the straight antitrust standard was still king.
The end result of the years of legislative activity that produced
the Bank Merger Act of 1966 can be briefly summarized: 158
 (1) the
two thousand bank mergers consummated before Philadelphia Bank
and after the Celler-Kefauver Amendment were immunized; (2) three
bank mergers attacked by the Justice Department were saved from
divestiture; (3) the Justice Department was given a thirty-day period
in which to decide whether to sue; (4) Justice was also given an auto-
matic stay of the merger approval once it filed suit; and (5) the
"convenience and needs of the community" defense was established. In
retrospect, it appears that the Justice Department and the three banks
were the real winners. The convenience and needs defense was severely
limited by Nashville Bank, and it appeared that the Justice Department
had little objection to the immunization of those two thousand or more
consummated but unattacked mergers. The availability of an automatic
stay was a substantial aid to the Government, since preliminary injunc-
tions are never easy to obtain and the denial of a preliminary injunction
motion is not appealable to what the Government and others might
consider a more sympathetic Supreme Court.
The value of this stay provision was illustrated in a recent case,
United States v. United Banks of Colorado, Inc. 169
 The defendants
argued that the stay should be lifted because (1) if it were not lifted
the contractual arrangements undertaken to acquire the bank in question
150 390 U.S. at 190.
157 Id. at 177.
158 See Searls & Reasoner, supra note 104, at 152-53.
1" 1971 Trade Cas. If 73,421 (D. Col. 1970). This case involved a bank holding
company merger but the "automatic stay" language in the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1966 is identical to that in the Bank Merger Act of 1966.
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would expire and the Government might thus be able to defeat the
merger without reaching the merits of the case; (2) there was substan-
tial doubt that the Government would prevail on the merits since the
case presented a novel, experimental and untried extension of antitrust
theory; and (3) the Government did not need a stay since the bank
holding company would maintain the bank as a separate entity and
would agree to any reasonable "hold separate" order. The district court
concluded that, while there may have been some equity to defendants'
claim, they had failed to prove the narrow issue of whether the govern-
ment's complaint was "frivolous" under the Provident-Houston stan-
dard.'" Therefore the defendants "failed to establish their burden to
overturn the statutory stay.""" If more courts construe the standard
as strictly as this one did, it may be presumed that no defendant will
be able to get the stay lifted, for whatever one might say about the
Antitrust Division's complaints, they certainly are not "frivolous."'"
It is safe to assume that the opinions in Provident-Houston and
Nashville Bank have served to nip many prospective mergers in the
bud. There is little point in banks going through the complicated prep-
arations for a merger if it becomes obvious that there is more than an
excellent chance the merger will be killed in the courts—even if it
would have been approved by the banking agencies. This prophylactic
effect was greatly enhanced by the next Supreme Court opinion, United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 1°3 a significant decision
for a number of reasons, one of which was that the banks involved were
small. Previously the Government had attacked mergers that would
have resulted in banks with total assets ranging from $6 billion"' to
leo Id. at 89,714.
lel Id.
102 In a later case, a district court ordered a dissolution of the stay after the de-
fendants agreed upon a plan of divestiture that was approved by the Comptroller of the
Currency and which the court found would "enable divestiture to be orderly and to be
readily and effectively obtainable and would protect the rights of all parties should
divestiture be the final judgment . . . ." United States v. United Virginia Bankshares,
Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. ir 73,466 (E.D. Va. 1971). This optimism seems to differ with the
testimony of various banking officials in the hearings that preceded the Bank Merger
Act of 1966. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve System had testified that "no matter
how one may feel about whether the merger should have taken place in the first
instance, there is no turning back. To unscramble the resulting bank clearly poses serious
problems not only for the bank but for its customers and the community." Hearings on
S. 1698 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Finance of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965). And the president of
the American Bankers Association declared that "'unmerging' a bank is not a simple
matter but, rather, can be a problem nightmarish in its complexities." Id. at 51.
163 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
164 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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$389 million. 185 The Phillipsburg merger, on the other hand, would
have produced a bank with $41 million in assets. Phillipsburg, then,
signified that the time had come for the small banks to look up and pay
attention to those opinions being handed down in Washington.
D. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank
Phillipsburg involved the proposed merger of two of three small
competing commercial banks located in Phillipsburg, New Jersey. The
district court, while recognizing "commercial banking" as a relevant
product market, looked to certain submarkets that involved competition
with other financial institutions. It rejected the geographic market
concept that had been recognized by the FDIC, the Federal Reserve
Board and the Department of Justice in their determinations that the
merger would have significantly harmful effects upon competition in
that area. Finally, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding
that there was no showing of probable anticompetitive effect and that
even were there any possibility of anticompetitive effect in the geo-
graphic market—an argument utilized by the Government—it would
be outweighed by the benefit to the "convenience and needs" of the
residents of Phillipsburg.
The Supreme Court reversed and found error in each of these
holdings. From Justice Brennan's opinion we can derive certain guide-
lines' that will be of assistance in the planning of future bank mergers,
both large and small. The first is that "commercial banking" is the
product market in which every horizontal bank merger will be judged.
If there are other submarkets, all well and good, but a bank will not
be able to justify a merger in terms of competition with other financial
institutions in these submarkets.
The second guideline is that the size of the bank is not going to
deter the application of the antitrust laws. The Court had this to say
about antitrust and small banks:
Mergers of directly competing small commercial banks in
small communities, no less than those of large banks in large
communities, are subject to scrutiny under these standards.
Indeed, competitive commercial banks, with their cluster of
products and services, play a particularly significant role in
a small community unable to support a large variety of alter-
native financial institutions. Thus, if anything, it is even more
true in the small town than in the large city that "if the busi-
165 United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Hawaii, Civil No. 2540, (D. Hawaii, filed
Nov. 17, 1969).
166 See Darnell, The Phillipsburg National Bank Case, 16 Antitrust Bull. 33, 46-49
(1971).
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nessman is denied credit because his banking alternatives
have been eliminated by mergers, the whole edifice of an
entrepreneurial system is threatened; if the costs of banking
services and credit are allowed to become excessive by the
absence of competitive pressures, virtually all costs, in our
credit economy, will be affected . . . ."'
Nor would it be advisable for banks to depend on the defense that the
relevant geographic market is too small to be "an economically signifi-
cant 'section' of the country" under the Brown Shoe"' standard. Defen-
dants made this argument on appeal and the Court rejected it, noting
that even in the Brown Shoe opinion it had recognized relevant geo-
graphic markets in cities "with a population exceeding 10,000 and
their environs."'" Phillipsburg and its immediate environs had a popu-
lation of almost 90,000. In fact, it would be rare to find a market with
a population of less than 10,000, and even then the Court might find it
to be an economically significant section of the country if enough banks
were competing for those 10,000 customers.
However, merely because the Justice Department can sue does
not mean that it will do so in every instance. In 1966 it failed to oppose
a merger of two of the only three banks in a relevant market when
those two banks had a sixty-seven percent share of the market."
Furthermore, the two were "nearly equal in size and competition be-
tween them [was] keen.""" On the other hand, they had deposits of
only $9,321,000 and $8,993,000 respectively, and the population of the
county was only 25,000. It must be remembered that this particular
merger occurred over four years before Phillipsburg and may no longer
be indicative of Justice policy today, and it must be admitted that it
may then have been indicative only of an overworked staff. In the same
year, however, the Department did file suit against two banks which
had deposits of $21,000,000 and $16,000,000 respectively,' and which
also had a market share of eighty-five percent of all deposits and eighty-
four percent of all loans. If there is a Justice Department de minimis
policy, then, it is inapplicable to all but the smallest banks.'
1" 399 U.S. at 358 (citation omitted).
168 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
169 Id. at 339.
116 See Reycraft, Bank Merger Compliance with the Antitrust Laws, 12 Antitrust
Bull. 445, 460 (1967).
171 Report of the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptroller of the Currency,
January 18, 1967.
172 United States v. First Nat'l Bank of State College, Civil No. 9433 (M.D. Pa.,
filed June 17, 1966).
178 In a more recent example, the justice Department filed suit and a district court
granted summary judgment, thereby blocking the merger of two small Vermont banks.
The court rejected the argument that the "section of the country" was too small to be
246
REVIEW OF THE LAW OF BANK MERGERS
The third guideline established in the Phillipsburg decision is that
when estimating the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger, one
should use a narrow geographic market. This is especially true if the
customers are small borrowers, depositors or businessmen. On this point
the Court said:
The localization of business typical of the banking indus-
try is particularly pronounced when small customers are in-
volved. We stated in Philadelphia Bank . . . that "in banking
the relevant geographical market is a function of each separate
customer's economic scale"—that "the smaller the customer,
the smaller is his banking market geographically," . . . . Small
depositors have little reason to deal with a bank other than the
one most geographically convenient to them.'"
The fourth guideline is that in balancing the benefits to the con-
venience and needs of the community against the anticompetitive effects
of a merger, one must use the same geographical market for both evalua-
tions. While this might seem an obvious requirement, the Supreme
Court found, despite appellee's argument to the contrary, that the dis-
trict court in Phillipsburg had judged the anticompetitive effect of the
merger in terms of Phillipsburg and its environs, including Easton,
Pennsylvania, while it had judged the benefit to the community with
respect to Phillipsburg only. The Court noted that the result of this
kind of balancing would be:
[a]pproval of a merger that, though it has anticompetitive
effects throughout the market, has countervailing beneficial
impact in only part of the market . . . [and] such a result
would unfairly deny the benefits of the merger to some of those
who sustain its direct and immediate anticompetitive effects. 17"
Finally, the fifth lesson we can derive from Phillipsburg is found
in the Court's reminder to the district court that in judging the con-
venience and needs of the community on remand, it must consider the
convenience and needs of all the customers of the bank, large and small,
and not restrict itself to those seeking larger loans or specialized
services.'" The Court reiterated its ruling in Nashville Bank that before
this examination is made, the court must first determine whether there
within the purview of section 7. United States • v. County Nat'l Bank of Bennington,
Civil No. 6088 (D. Vt., filed Jan. 1, 1972). For a discussion of this case, see text at notes
189-92 Infra.
174 399 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted).
175 Id. at 371-72.
170 Id. at 372.
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existed alternative solutions that could have solved the bank's problems
and thus benefited the community without a merger. 177
Justice Harlan's dissent in Phillipsburg questioned the Govern-
ment's filing suit in the first place. "With tigers still at large in our
competitive jungle, why should the Department be taking aim at such
small game?" 178
 Harlan acknowledged, however, that from the Justice
Department's point of view, the result of the decision fully justified
the effort, since "[a] fter today's opinion the legality of every merger
of two directly competing banks—no matter how small—is placed in
doubt if a court, through what has become an exercise in 'antitrust
numerology,' concludes that the merger 'produces a firm controlling
an undue percentage share of the relevant market.' 71" The Depart-
ment's effort did indeed save both it and the federal banking agencies
much work, since it can be safely assumed that, following the Phillips-
burg decision, a considerable number of mergers between small and
medium size banks that might have been attempted before that decision
would not be undertaken.
VI. WAS IT WORTH IT?
We have already discussed the purpose of the Bank Merger Act
of 1960. Congress intended to check the growing bank concentration
resulting from mergers which would prove detrimental to the general
economy and, possibly, to the small bank customer trying to obtain
credit.'" Did the ten years of effort by the Justice Department, the
federal banking agencies and the courts, and the additional effort of
Congress in passing the Bank Merger Act of 1966, produce a result
concomitant with that original congressional purpose? A recent empiri-
cal study by two economists has concluded that it did."' They analyzed
various standard metropolitan statistical areas and found that in the
1960's concentration had declined or leveled off from the concentration
ratios of the 1950's. Furthermore, the phenomenon that dramatized the
need for legislation, the big bank merger, had disappeared: "Clearly,
combinations of major banks in the same city appear now to be a
thing of the past."'" They also computed the concentration ratio of
177 Id.
178 Id. at 374.
179
 Id. (citations omitted).
180 It was feared that the larger banks resulting from the merger trend would be
less sympathetic with small borrowers. See Shull & Horvitz, The Bank Merger Act of
1960: A Decade After, 16 Antitrust Bull. 859, 865 (1971).
191
 See id. passim. As the authors point out, while it might be argued that part of
the congressional purpose was to establish that banking was "different" and warranted
special treatment, it nevertheless can be safely stated that Congress intended to stop a
merger trend it considered undesirable. Therefore it is fair to appraise the results on
this basis. Id. at 868.
192 Id. at 888.
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the three largest banks in several large cities and what the increased
ratio would have been if some of the proposed mergers in those cities
had not been denied.'" However, as the authors pointed out, "it is
clear that this is a minimal measure of the impact of the Bank Merger
Act. Without application of antitrust standards to banking, it is
certain that additional mergers would have been proposed."'"
Has the small bank customer benefited? As we saw in Phillipsburg,
both the Government and the Supreme Court were very concerned with
guaranteeing the small customer the protection of the antitrust laws.
The Court had said: "The effect [of ruling in favor of defendants]
would likely be to deny customers of small banks—and thus residents
of many small towns—the antitrust protection to which they are no
less entitled that customers of large city banks."'" Moreover, the recent
case of United States v. County Nat'l Bank,i 8e discussed below, indi-
cates that this concern is not being ignored by the district courts.
Another procompetitive change has taken place since the passage
of the 1960 Act. The federal banking agencies, which at first seemed
to resent the intrusion of competitive principles in merger approvals,
have adjusted to the overriding purpose of the Act and are now applying
antitrust standards in the same manner as have the courts. The actions
of the Federal Reserve Board have exemplified this trend; in fact, the
Board has been complimented by the Justice Department for its
efforts in this area."' The FDIC has also been applying these standards.
For instance, following the Phillipsburg decision the Chairman of the
FDIC announced that the new critical point in weighing the antitrust
aspects of a merger would be whether fifteen percent of the total bank-
ing assets in the market were being concentrated.'"
183 SMSA Percent 3-Bank
Concentration Ratio
Concentration Ratio
If All Mergers Approved
Atlanta 62.1 70.1
Baltimore 64.2 81.0
Houston 44.8 53.2
Louisville 69.1 82.1
New York 44.3 49.9
Philadelphia 46.3 61.6
Id. at 882.
184 Id. at 881.
185 399 U.S. at 361-62.
180
 United States v. County Nat'l Bank of Bennington, Civil No. 6088 (D. Vt., filed
Jan. 1, 1972). See notes 189-92 infra and accompanying text.
187 See Statement of Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen'!, Antitrust Div., Hear-
ings on S. 1052 et al. Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 244 (1970) (hereinafter cited as McLaren Statement).
188 See Darnell, supra note 166, at 50-51, In a speech made nine months after
Phillipsburg, Chairman Wille of the FDIC stated that "it is unlikely that many mergers
of viable banks already competing in the same market can be justified [under Phillips-
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In contrast to this trend, however, the Comptroller of the Currency
recently approved a merger in Bennington, Vermont, which if con-
summated—the . Comptroller conceded—would tend to lessen competi-
tion substantially and to create a commercial banking monopoly in the
geographic market.'" He justified the decision by the fact that the
market was simply too insignificant to be regarded as a "section of
the country" within the meaning of the Act. The Justice Department
filed suit and the Comptroller intervened on behalf of the defendants.'"
It should be recalled that the Comptroller intervened in Phillipsburg,
two years prior to Bennington, after having approved the merger, and
a similar argument, based on the "insignificance" of the market, had
been rejected by the Supreme Court. The district court,'" granting
summary judgment for the Government, cited Phillipsburg and con-
cluded that the position of the Comptroller was "contrary to that
adopted in decisions by the Supreme Court and belies the manifesta-
tions of congressional intent indicating that the particular product
involved is of substantial importance in determining an area constituting
a section of the country for purpose of the Clayton Act."'
VII. TILE VALUE OF THE BANK MERGER ACT OF 1960
One might ask whether the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was very
instrumental in achieving these procompetitive results; after all, it
had been apparent after the Firstamerica decision that the Justice
Department was going to sue under the antitrust laws with or without
the Act.193
 This fact, however, should not be allowed to obscure the
principal significance of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, which lies not
in its application of the antitrust laws to bank mergers—an accomplish-
ment of Philadelphia Bank—but rather in its requirement that a federal
agency approve with the advice of the Justice Department every pro-
posed bank merger. This requirement is a marked improvement upon
the hit-or-miss approach that results when the Antitrust Division is
forced to discover and evaluate every merger in all industries and then
burg]." Address by Will; The Bank Merger Act Revisited, Washington, D.C., March 26,
1971.
189 The Comptroller had previously criticized the Nashvilk-Phillipsburg approach
as "too inflexible," in that it unduly limited his discretion in approving mergers he
thought advantageous. Address by the Comptroller, Financial Competition in a Regulated
Environment, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1971.
190 United States v. County Nat'l Bank of Bennington, Civil No. 6088 (D. Vt., filed
Jan. 1, 1972).
191 Circuit Judge Waterman was sitting by designation.
192 Mr. Camp has also been criticized for not requiring banks to seek alternative
methods of solving their problems before approving their merger using the Phillipsburg
standard. See Baker, Competition's Role in the Regulation of Banking, 154 The Bankers
Magazine 75, 80 (No. 3, 1971).
198 See text at note 85 supra.
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prepare a case in time to file a motion for a preliminary injunction. The
Antitrust Division obviously does not have the manpower to attack
every merger, and without the notification and stay provisions of the
1960 Act it would not be able to prevent the consummation of those
it did attack. Its burden is further lightened by the fact that the banking
agencies are now applying for the most part the same criteria as the
Antitrust Division in judging proposed bank mergers.'"
The 1960 Act has also had an effect on related areas in banking.
This effect has been discussed in another study"' and although the
details of that study are not within the scope of this article its conclusion
is of interest:
In a more general sense, the introduction of effective con-
straints on bank conbinations in the 1960's may be viewed as
part of the process of dismantling the pervasive controls which
were erected in the early part of the 20th century to stabilize
individual commercial banks, and which invariably suppressed
competition. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 is a principal
element in the reintroduction of competition and competitive
ethics to an industry which had, since the mid-1930's, with-
drawn into regulated and cooperative methods of doing busi-
ness. 10°
Finally, the ten years of application of antitrust laws to bank
mergers have had another procompetitive effect. The Justice Depart-
ment has been so successful in blocking horizontal mergers that a
shift of interest to market and product extension mergers has occurred.
Both of these types of mergers have potential for increasing competi-
tion and in that respect are more valuable than horizontal mergers,
which have little or no capacity to accomplish that result. The re-
mainder of this article will explore these two types of mergers, along
with the growth of bank holding companies and the legislation that
has been passed to regulate them.
VIII. MARKET EXTENSION MERGERS
A market extension merger is a form of conglomerate merger. It
is the acquisition of a firm located in a different geographic market but
engaged in the same line of commerce as the acquiring firm; in banking,
such a merger would be accomplished by a bank or bank holding com-
pany acquiring another bank in a geographic area in which the former
had not competed. A market extension bank merger is dealt with in the
1" See text at notes 187-88 supra.
105 See text at notes 180-84 supra.
1" Shull & Horvitz, supra note 180, at 889.
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same .manner as a conglomerate merger in any industry. However, the
Justice Department has had very little success in its attempts to block
market extension bank mergers. Of all the bank mergers of any kind
attacked by the Department since 1963, the year of the Philadelphia
Bank decision, only five were eventually effected, all of which were
market extension mergers.'" In its effort to present a suitable case for
initial Supreme Court review, the Department passed over the first
four in this group, and finally filed an appeal in United States v. First
Nat'l Bancorp.,198 which will be heard in the Court's October 1972 term.
A. The Potential Competition Theory
The three principal theories used to attack conglomerate mergers,
and hence applicable in suits attempting to block bank market extension
mergers, are potential competition, entrenchment and reciprocity. The
first of these is firmly embedded in the antitrust laws and has frequently
been used in suits involving mergers in other industries. The anti-
competitive effect standard, which is the crux of the potential com-
petition theory, really involves double incipiency—a merger which may
tend to eliminate potential competition is unlawful.'" Potential com-
petition serves both as a supplement to and as a substitute for actual
competition. If a firm is aware that there are other firms on the
"periphery" of its market with the ability and interest to enter the
market, it will be motivated in much the same manner as though the
peripheral firms were already competing with it. Potential competition
plays its biggest role in concentrated markets which have what is
termed "imperfect competition." 204 Therefore it is particularly applic-
able to the banking industry.
Thus far, however, the theory has not proved useful to the govern-
ment in its unsuccessful attempts to block market extension mergers
by banks, despite its considerable success in opposing such mergers
in other industries. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board has blocked
bank holding company mergers on the basis of a probable lessening
of potential competition."' What, therefore, is the reason for the
197
 United States v. First Nat'l Bancorp., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Col. 1971); United
States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1970); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 310 F. Supp. 157 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-
Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
198
 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Col. 1971), probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U.S. 915
(1972).
199 See Cohen, The Antitrust Laws Applied to Bank Mergers, Reciprocity and Tie-in
Arrangements, 26 Bus. Law. 1, 4 (1970).
200 "Imperfect competition" may be defined as "competition among sellers of in-
homogeneous products in which the sellers are sufficiently few in number so that each
exerts an influence upon the market." Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary 1133 (1961).
201 See, e.g., Statement of Fed. Reserve Bd. on Application of BT New York Corp.,
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Government's lack of success in the banking field? It has been suggested
that it can be attributed to the district courts' reliance on issues that
do not involve potential competition, such as the "convenience and
needs" defense."' Another possibility is that the Justice Department
has chosen the wrong mergers to attack. Whether or not either of
these hypotheses is true, it is apparent that there is at least one "poten-
tial competition" problem that is peculiar to bank mergers and that
might explain why the theory has not been efficacious in blocking such
mergers. This is that banks need regulatory approval to enter new
markets. In four out of five Government "defeats," the court relied
to some extent on a finding that the appropriate federal banking agency
would not have allowed de novo entry by the acquiring bank into the
relevant market, and hence the only method by which the bank in
question could enter the desired market was through merging with a
pre-existing bank."' The Government will undoubtedly seek a Supreme
Court ruling on the propriety of this contention, but until such a ruling
is made, it appears that the banking agency's determination will con-
tinue to carry weight.
So far as other aspects of the potential competition issue are
concerned, however, the Supreme Court has already provided ample
guidance. Three of the more important opinions are the Procter &
Gamble,'" Penn-Olin,'" and El Paso Natural Gas2" decisions, which
have established the criteria for determining who potential competitors
are. These criteria are, of course, applicable to bank mergers, since it
was established in Philadelphia Bank and re-established in Provident-
Houston that those mergers are within the scope of the antitrust laws.'
Once the potential entrants into the relevant market have been identified,
one must ascertain, as in all merger cases, the relevant product line or
May 4, 1967; Statement of Fed. Reserve Ed. on Application of Allied Bankshares Corp.,
April 18, 1967.
202 whitesell, Potential Competition and Bank Mergers, 88 Banking L.J. 387, 393
(1971):
Superficially, it seems that district courts have been reluctant to assign a very
great weight to potential competition in commercial banking cases. Examination
in detail of each of these cases, however, leads to a contrary solution—that is,
the decisions have turned on factors other than potential competition . .
203
 The exception is United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 310 F. Supp.
157 (D. Md. 1970). All five cases are listed in note 197 supra.
204 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
205 'United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
200 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
207 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Court has scheduled the
Bancorp. case to be argued in conjunction with the Falstaff-Narragansett beer merger
case, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971), probable
jurisdiction noted, 405 U.S. 952 (1972). This is perhaps an indication that the Court plans
to treat the application of the potential competition issue to bank mergers in the same
manner as in other industries.
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"line of commerce" and the geographic market or "section of the
country." It appears from the emphasis in Phillipsburg that the product
market in potential competition cases will be the same as in the direct
competition cases—that is, "commercial banking." 2" However, the
Philadelphia Bank doctrine that the market varies with the type of
customer—small, medium and large—is always applicable in all cases,
as is Phillipsburg's lesson that the localized nature of banking markets,
and in particular the concept of the smaller market for banks with small
customers, must be respected.
There are several criteria to be used in determining whether a
potential competitor is likely to enter the market. At the outset it should
be remembered that this is an objective and not a subjective test.
Specific questions to be asked are: (1) What are the present and future
growth prospects of the market? (2) What are the barriers to entry,
including the possibility of disapproval by the Comptroller? (3) What
is the financial and managerial capacity of the firm? and (4) What is
the bank's past history of mergers and branching?
Once the relevant market and the most likely entrants have been
identified, there still remains the question of what factors will prompt
the Justice Department to challenge a prospective merger. The Depart-
ment's Merger Guidelines provide some help here, 2 D9 but they are
very general and, since there is an absence of controlling legal precedent
—the federal district court opinions carry little precedential weight
without Supreme Court consideration of these issues—we will have
208 Of the five market extension rgePs, only the court in Bancorp. used this product
market exclusively. Phillipsburg, by the way, seems to have negated the three-judge
panel ruling in Crocker-Anglo that the omission of the words "line of commerce" from
the Bank Merger Act of 1966 made it proper to consider the competitive effect of other
financial institutions, thereby diluting the "commercial banking" market. United States
v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1970).
200 The appropriate provision reads:
. . . the Department will ordinarily challenge the merger between one of the
most likely entrants into the market and:
(i) any firm with approximately 25 percent or more of the market;
(ii) one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the
two largest firms amount to approximately 50 percent or more;
(iii) one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares of the
eight largest firms amount to approximately 75 percent or more, provided the
merging firm's share of the market amounts to approximately 10 percent or
more; or
(iv) one of the eight largest firms in a market in which the shares of these
firms amount to approximately 75 percent or more, provided either (A) the
merging firm's share of the market is not insubstantial and there are no more
than one or two likely entrants into the market or (B) the merging firm is a
rapidly growing firm.
Dep't of justice Merger Guidelines 22, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. 9 4430 (May 30,
1968).
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to wait, as was the case with horizontal bank mergers and with
antitrust law in general, for the Supreme Court to establish further
guidelines.
B. The Entrenchment Theory
The entrenchment theory, used when a large firm or "giant"
enters a market of smaller firms through a merger, argues that the large
firm with its resources will scare off any potential entrants into the
market and will also intimidate the firms already there.21° The Procter
& Gamble case cited in the discussion of potential competition, is the
principal authority for this theory, and the Department of Justice
has dealt with entrenchment in its Merger Guidelines. 211 Despite the
existence of these authorities, however, the entrenchment theory at this
point is not as thoroughly established as other tests, such as potential
competition. Furthermore, use of the theory is likely to be successful
only in suits against very large bank holding companies and banks
which have vast resources and marketing know-how; it is hardly ap-
plicable in those suits involving middle-sized and less sophisticated
banks.
210 In only one of the five bank cases mentioned at note 197 supra was this an issue.
The court in Bank of Jackson found that the "tpJlaintiff wholly failed to convince this
Court of the validity of this contention because of a complete lack of credible factual
evidence." United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1206-07 (S.D. Miss.
1969).
211 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967). Regarding
"Mergers Which Entrench Market Power and Other Conglomerate Mergers," the Merger
Guidelines provide:
The Department will ordinarily investigate the possibility of anticompetitive
consequences, and may in particular circumstances bring suit, where an acqui-
sition of a leading firm in a relatively concentrated or rapidly concentrating
market may serve to entrench or increase the market power of that firm or raise
barriers to entry in that market. Examples of this type of merger include: (i) a
merger which produces a very large disparity in absolute size between the
merged firm and the largest remaining .firms in the relevant markets, (ii) a
merger of firms producing related products which may induce purchasers, con-
cerned about the merged firm's possible use of leverage, to buy products of the
merged firm rather than those of competitors, and (ill) a merger which may
enhance the ability of the merged firm to increase product differentiation in
relevant markets.
Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines 25, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. II 4430 (May 30,
1968).
These guidelines are obviously very general and create more questions than they
answer. For example, how large is a "very large disparity"? When are products suf-
ficiently related to induce purchasers to be concerned about the possible use of leverage?
And what are the criteria for judging the ability of a merged firm to "increase product
differentiation in the relevant markets"? These and other questions will have to be
answered by the courts and will probably require more than one opinion of the Supreme
Court. See Reycraft, Antitrust Problems in Banking-1971, 16 Antitrust Bull, 817, 829
(1971).
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C. Reciprocity
• Reciprocity, the third ground for attracting a conglomerate merger,
was first established in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.," a 1965
decision. In effect, the doctrine of reciprocity prohibits trade practices
of the "you scratch my back and scratch yours" variety, whether
such practices are entered into willingly or through coercion. It is
most applicable to a bank holding company in an instance where bank-
ing customers might be encouraged or coerced into using the non-
banking services of the company. As word of such practices gets
around, overt coercion and explicit mutual agreements may become
less common. However, customers of the bank may voluntarily seek
non-banking services of the holding company in order to "score points"
with the bank. This practice, called the "reciprocity effect," is impossible
to attack under the Sherman Act because it entails no conspiracy in
restraint of trade, but merely arises from the efforts of a customer who
is looking out for what he considers his economic self-interest without
any encouragement from the bank. It is therefore a problem inherent in
the market structure and can be prevented only by blocking the merger.
It will be discussed more fully below in the section on bank holding
companies."'
The competitive evil of both reciprocity and the "reciprocity effect"
is that they virtually take a particular product or service out of the
marketplace. The individual merits of the product or service are no
longer at issue, but rather what advantage can be gained in another
transaction. The Government has been successful in pressing this claim
and has obtained quite a number of consent judgments.2" Reciprocity,
however, has not been at issue in any of the five market extension
bank mergers so far lost by the Government.215
212 380 U.S. 592 (1965). The theory was later expanded in United States v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See Cohen, supra note 199, at 5.
213 See text following note 225 infra.
214 See, e.g., United States v. H. K. Porter Co., Civil No. 72-285 (W.D. Pa., filed
April 12, 1972), judgment entered May 17, 1972; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
Civil No. 70-3102 (ED. Pa., filed Nov. 10, 1970), judgment entered Dec. 11, 1970;
United States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. C-67155 (N.D. Ohio, filed March
2, 1967), judgment entered Oct. 21, 1970.
215 The close sister of reciprocity is the "tie-in." This was proscribed as a per se
violation of the antitrust laws in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958). A much more recent case, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969), has raised serious tie-in questions for banks. However, since these
questions are concerned more with the banking services than with hank mergers they
will not be discussed here other than to point out that consideration of tie-in problems
would be relevant when contemplating a product extension merger and the possible
objections the Antitrust Division might have to that merger.
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IX. PRODUCT EXTENSION MERGERS
A product extension merger is also a form of conglomerate merger.
It occurs when a firm acquires another firm that is in a similar market
but engaged in a different line of commerce: for example, when a bank
holding company acquires a credit card company. The Federal Trade
Commission described this type of merger in Procter & Gamble as an
entry into "a market which adjoins, as it were, those markets in which
[a company] is already established, and which is virtually indistin-
guishable from them insofar as problems and techniques of marketing
the product to the ultimate consumer are concerned.""° The same
theories that are used against market extension bank mergers can be
used against product extension bank mergers.
There have not been many product extension bank merger suits.
In 1965 the Antitrust Division filed one against the First National City
Bank for its acquisition of Carte Blanche."' It was eventually settled
by a consent decree in which First National City sold Carte Blanche
and agreed not to reacquire it's In 1969 the Division intended to file
another suit against First National City for its proposed acquisition of
Chubb & Sons, a large casualty insurance firm. The Government feared
that the acquisition would create the classic opportunity for tying
insurance to loans and vice versa. When First National City learned
of the Government's opposition, it abandoned the transaction before
the complaint was filed."' Recently the Department filed a suit against
Wachovia Corporation, 22° the parent of the largest commercial bank
in the Southeast, opposing its proposed acquisition of American Credit,
a $400 million institution operating in sales and consumer financing,
factoring and insurance. The complaint alleged elimination of actual
and potential competition as well as the possibility of reciprocity, tying
and tying effect. This action is presently stayed, pending proceedings
before the Federal Reserve Board.
The rules regarding product extension mergers were changed
recently. New bank holding company legislation was passed which will
restrict some of the freedom which one-bank holding companies have
had in acquiring non-banking firms and will give more leeway to multi-
bank bolding companies which have been subject to the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956. This legislation will be discussed below.
218 386 U.S. at 577-78, quoting 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1545 (1963).
217 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, Civil No. 65-3963, (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec.
30, 1965).
218 Id., consent judgment entered April 10, 1968.
219 See McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 240.
220 United States v. Wachovia Corp., Civil No. 2656 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
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X. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
This country has had a traditional policy of separating commercial
banking from other areas of economic activity. There are three princi-
pal considerations behind this policy: 221 (1) the desire to insure the
solvency of the banks; (2) the fear that affiliation of banks and non-
banking businesses would create unfair competitive advantages; and
(3) the general concern over economic concentration throughout the
economy. This policy is represented in the Glass-Stegall Act of 1932, 2'
which prohibited banks from engaging in the securities business in
order to avoid repetition of the abuses of 1920's. One might also say
that the antithesis of that policy is in effect in countries such as Japan
where banks have become the centers of huge industrial-commercial
groups.
The first and third considerations behind this national policy are
not novel and have been discussed elsewhere; hence we will not
discuss them further here. It might be helpful, however, to explore
briefly the second consideration—the fear that affiliation of banks and
non-banking business would create unfair competitive advantages.
As has been noted, banks usually compete in concentrated markets
of a local nature. Since the public is usually faced with limited banking
alternatives, the banks have thus been able to exercise considerable
market power. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in Philadelphia
Bank and Phillipsburg, bank customers, excluding the huge national
ones, tend to patronize their local bank even if they could travel to
another bank for a better interest rate. Unlike firms in other industries,
banks do not have to worry about competitors freely coming in and
deconcentrating their markets because branch banking is closely reg-
ulated by state banking agencies and is forbidden outright in one-third
of the states.'
Banks probably exercise their economic power most strongly in
the credit area. Traditionally, bank-customer relationships are not of the
short-lived, high-turnover type, but the credit relationships between
bank and customer tends to be even more long-lasting; in other words,
one usually does not shop around for credit. Obtaining credit can re-
quire the disclosure of highly personal or sensitive competitive infor-
mation. Moreover, some borrowers depend on local reputation for credit
and cannot afford to jeopardize their good standing with the bank that
has acknowledged this reputation. A long-term relationship, with a
proper showing of loyalty by the customer, may help in times of tight
221 See McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 238.
222 47 Stat. 56, 12 U.S.C. 411 347a,b, 412, as amended, 12 U.S.C.
	
347a,b, 412
(1945).
222 See Shull & Horvitz, supra note 180, at 883.
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money if the bank decides to look after its own—an informal method
of credit rationing.
An additional consideration is the fact that the bank customer
often does not possess the same degree of financial sophistication—or,
just as importantly, feels he does not—as the bank officers. One can
see that this reliance on the supposed expertise of banks gives the banks
economic power even if, as one Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division has said, "it is the subconscious exercise of economic
power."224
When a bank expands into a non-banking market this economic
power does not disappear; on the contrary, it can strongly influence the
competitive make-up of the non-banking market. There is the marked
danger of reciprocity, tying2" and the reciprocity effect. The last
factor is the most important from the Antitrust Division's point of
view, and the Division appears unable to prevent its occurrence. For
example, if First National City Bank had acquired Chubb & Sons,
a casualty insurance firm, and if a potential loan applicant of First
National City had placed all of his casualty insurance business with
Chubb in the hopes, however unfounded, that it would help him secure
a loan or obtain more favorable terms, competition in the casualty
insurance market would have been damaged whether or not the cus-
tomer's actions eventually had any effect on his loan. The problem,
then, is one of market structure and can be checked only by blocking
the merger. This is what the Antitrust Division decided to do, and in
this particular situation, as mentioned above, First National City
abandoned the transaction after it learned of the Department's op-
position.
It can be seen, therefore, that the fear that affiliation of banks with
non-banking businesses will create unfair competitive advantages is
very well-founded, especially when one considers that the structure of
financial markets tends to be an enduring one and that divestitures
tend to be difficult.
A. The Genesis of the Bank Holding Company
The period after World War II saw tremendous growth in all sec-
tions of the American economy. The banking public demanded more and
new kinds of services. By the 1960's, as a result both of these demands
and of changes in technology, especially the development of the com-
puter, it was hard to discern what was and what was not banking. Yet
the industry was still regulated by laws based on concepts of banking
developed in the 1930's. The banks resented these laws, which they
224 McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 239.
220 See note 215 supra,
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considered anachronistic, and they did not want to be left out of the
mainstream of the nation's economic growth. They sought ways to
expand both geographically and functionally, following the example
of corporate conglomerates. In other words, they were looking for a
piece of the action. It was the development of the bank holding com-
pany, particularly the one-bank holding company, which gave it to
them.
The bank holding company structure enabled banks to go into
non-banking fields and also enabled corporate conglomerates to go
into banking. This concept was a novel one and Congress soon moved
to impose the traditional banking limitations on the activities it entailed.
In 1956 it passed the Bank Holding Company Act," whose two prin-
cipal purposes were to control the acquisition of banks by holding
companies and to restrict the non-banking activities of the holding
companies. It performed these functions simply by limiting the kinds
of non-banking activities in which they could invest• and by limiting
the activities of the holding companies themselves. 227
 However, there
was one important exception: the Act did not regulate the activities of
one-bank holding companies. In 1956 there was little concern with such
companies, which for the most part were small and local in nature,
formed for the convenience of small investors. They had no real effect
on the national economy and, although some conglomerates had made
single bank acquisitions, they had done so largely for investment pur-
poses. Moreover, the banks were usually kept separate from the other
activities of the conglomerate 228
B. The Growth of One-Bank Holding Companies
In 1956 there were only 117 one-bank holding companies, which
controlled 11.6 billion dollars in commercial bank deposits 229
 By 1965
the number had grown to 550, controlling 15 billion dollars in deposits,
or four and a half percent of all the commercial bank deposits in the
country.' By the first part of 1968 the amount of bank deposits con-
trolled had grown to 18 billion dollars231 Then on July 3, 1968, First
National City Bank announced that it intended to take the one-bank
holding company route to expand its activities outside the banking
field232
 A new gold rush had begun; by the end of 1969 there were 890
226
 70 Stat. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C. H 1841 et seq. (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
H 1841-43, 1849 (1970).
227
 See Blaine, Registered Bank Holding Companies and the One-Bank Holding
Company,	 Bus. Law. 9, 11 (1970).
ylId.. 26 usatB10.
230 Id.
281 McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 245.
232 Id.
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one-bank holding companies with 181 billion dollars of commercial
banking deposits or forty-three percent of all bank deposits in the
country.' This unbelievable growth, and overnight concentration of
the nation's banking assets caused considerable concern. Among the
first to act was Congressman Patman, who in 1969 introduced legis-
lation to control one-bank holding companies.
C. Bank Holding Company Legislation: The Background of the
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of .1970
The legislation initiated by Congressman Patman, which eventually
would be enacted as the Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970,
should be viewed against its background: various industry lobbies were
pushing to confine banking to its own backyard; the banking lobby
was trying to break down those backyard fences; and others, including
the Antitrust Division and the Treasury Department, sought to estab-
lish flexible boundaries that would do the most for competition regard-
less of the industry involved. Through it all ran the question, What
is banking?
Congressman Patman's bill 2" was changed in the House Banking
and Currency Committee and reported out through a parliamentary
maneuver of the minority Republicans and five Democrats.'" When it
reached the floor it was significantly changed as a result of lobbying
as well as considerable anti-bank sentiment,' and a stricter bill was
passed and went to the Senate.
The Senate was faced with three legislative proposals: the House
bill, an Administration bill and a bill introduced by Senator Proxmire?'
All three were intended to close the "one-bank holding company" loop-
hole in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Both the Administra-
tion bill and the House bill changed provisions of the 1956 Act dealing
with non-banking activities of bank holding companies. While the
language in each was different, the overall concept was the same. The
Administration proposal retained supervision in the three banking
agencies, in much the same fashion as did the Bank Merger Act of 1960,
while the House bill gave sole supervision to the Federal Reserve Board.
The House bill would also have completely proscribed bank expansion
into certain non-banking activities; this feature was a testament to
the strength of the lobbies in the industries concerned. The Antitrust
288 Blaine, supra note 227, at 10.
234 H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
235 Blaine, supra note 227, at 10-11.
238 As one bank holding company representative remarked, "all the venom and
frustration against interest rates, banking, conglomerates and all the rest of it 'came out
and the Bill was completely rewritten • . ." Id. at 11.
23T H.R. 6778, S. 1664, S. 1052, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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Division opposed this "negative laundry list" of proscribed industries
because it had not been demonstrated that banking expansion would
be harmful to competition in these industries, and the absolute exclu-
sion of banking would immediately wipe out the effect of banking as
a potential competitor in those industries. 2" Senator Proxmire's bill
was essentially a stop-gap measure that would have made the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 applicable to one-bank holding com-
panies pending further study by a newly-created Presidential Com-
mission on Banking. All three bills would have left intact all existing
antitrust remedies.
D. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970m 9
The 1970 Act Amendments have been called "the most important
piece of banking legislation in at least a generation." 2" They reflected
the traditional policy towards banking discussed above, but also recog-
nized that the distinction between banking and other financial activities
had been blurred and that the entry of banking into other financial
fields, though potentially dangerous to competition, could be procom-
petitive.
1. Administration
The principal section for our concern is section 4(c) (8),241 which
deals with the affiliation of banks with non-banking firms. The House
version giving approval authority solely to the Federal Reserve Board
was enacted. This method seems preferable for two main reasons: it is
simpler, and conflicting interpretations by different agencies, which often
emerged under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, are entirely precluded.
Single-agency approval forecloses the possibility of "forum shopping,"
i.e., the possibility that a holding company would alter the character of
a bank affiliate in order that it might fall within the jurisdiction of the
agency whose interpretation would be most desirable for that particular
transaction. The fact that the Administration bill would have required
unanimous approval by all three agencies would not have completely
prevented this situation, while at the same time it would have made
administration of the section more complex.
If one-agency approval is best, why was the Federal Reserve Board
granted this authority? The answer is that the Board already had had
experience under the old Section 4(c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company
288 See McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 243.
289
 12	 H 1841 at seq. (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. H 184143, 1849 (1970).
240 Address by Donald Baker, The Brand New Ball Game—Bank Holding Company
Competition in the 1970's, at 1, Before the Regional Conference of the American
Bankers Ass'n, Denver, Colo., November 16, 1971.
241 12 U.S.C.	 1843(c)(8) (1970).
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Act of 1956, which regulated multi-bank holding company expansion.
Furthermore, the Board's members traditionally include distinguished
professional economists who are well-qualified to make the decisions
involved. And, as a past head of the Antitrust Division testified in the
hearings on the Amendments:
[I]n our view, the Board has done a generally sound and
responsible job of handling bank acquisitions under the com-
petitive tests established under the Bank Holding Company
Acts of 1956 and 1966 and the Bank Merger Acts of 1960
and 1966. There is no reason to believe it would not carry
forward such experience and policy and capability in applying
the new competitive tests for nonbanking acquisitions . . . . 242
Finally, the Board was given the power to approve subsequent bank
acquisitions by all bank holding companies. Had a three-agency ap-
proval system been enacted, then, the banking and non-banking activi-
ties of a bank holding company could have been regulated by two
different agencies. This state of affairs would have caused duplication
and waste of agency expertise, and would have created uncertainty in
bank holding company planning and operations.
2. Substantive Standards'
Under the 1970 Amendments, the Federal Reserve Board can
permit bank holding companies, both single and multi-bank, to acquire
companies, "the activities of which the Board after due notice and op-
portunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto."248 Therefore, as a first step in determining
whether approval is to be granted, the Board must determine whether
the activities of the company to be acquired are "closely related to
banking." Consequently, under no circumstances will a bank holding
company be engaged in making automobiles, refrigerators or popcorn.
The Board has already issued Regulation Y244 classifying certain
activities as fitting the statutory standard.
As a second step the 1970 Amendments require the Board to
determine whether the acquisition will be in the "public interest," or
more specifically:
[W]hether [performance of the activity proposed by the hold-
ing company, under the particular circumstances involved]
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public,
242 McLaren Statement, supra note 187, at 244.
243 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
244 12 C.F.R. § 225.1 et seq. (1972).
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such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains
in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
don, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.'"
The Amendments authorize the Board to distinguish between de novo
activities and acquisitions—a recognition that de novo entry is prima
facie procompetitive. Regulation Y provides that if the bank holding
company engages in any of the listed activities de novo, such activity
will be deemed in the public interest and will be approved unless the
applicant is notified to the contrary within forty-five days.'" Both
Congress and the Board, then, are markedly concerned with effects on
competition. As one veteran antitrust observer noted, although the
Amendments set out more banking factors than competitive factors,
"Mt nevertheless seems clear that 'increased competition' and 'undue
concentration of resources' will be the paramount standards to be
applied."'"
After much hard fighting, the "negative laundry list" was excluded
from the 1970 Amendments. Although objected to by those industries
who would have been protected from banking competition, this exclu-
sion seems to be for the best. While the exclusion does not mean that
expansion will be allowed into all of those industries, it does mean that
the Board has flexibility in this area and, after further experience under
the Act, may change its mind if it appears banking expansion will serve
the public interest. In other words, Congress, recognizing that there
is little or no evidence justifying absolute exclusion of banking entry
into a given field—with the exception of the securities industry—has
wisely left the final decision to an expert banking agency while supply-
ing public interest standards to be applied by the agency.'"
It should not be forgotten that even after gaining Board approval
an acquisition may be attacked under the antitrust laws. A by-product
of litigation attacking bank holding companies' acquisitions of non-
banking firms under the Act will be further guidelines on product
extension bank mergers.
The final success or failure of the 1970 Amendments will not be
measured by how well they were drafted but in their application. Bank
holding company legislation is vitally important to the economic well-
245 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
248 36 Fed. Reg. 21666 ( 1 971)..
247 Reycraft, Antitrust Problems in Banking-1971, 16 Antitrust Bull. 817, 839
(1971).
248 •Pursuant to these standards, the Federal Reserve Board recently announced that
it would allow its twelve regional reserve banks to approve applications from one-bank
holding companies, provided certain guidelines are met. See New York Times, Oct. 31,
1972, at 65, cols. 1-2.
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being of this country. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments
of 1970 are a good, equitable approach to the problem, but as one
Antitrust Division official has said, "the enactment of the statute is—
in Churchill's phrase--`not the end, It is not even the beginning of
the end. But it is perhaps, the end of the beginning. ) »240
240 Baker, supra note 240, at 1.
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